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The privilege against self-incrimination is an important feature of both
the English and American legal systems.I Its roots are traceable to events in
English legal history which continue to play a role in defining the scope of
the doctrine in each country. 2 Because the privilege reflects a restriction
upon the power of the state to employ coercive authority in the highly visible
sphere of criminal law enforcement, both countries have found it to be a
source of controversy and intense public scrutiny.3 Fundamental challenges
to the principles behind the privilege, as well as serious calls for its restruc-
turing appear regularly in both English and Americn legal debates.
4
What is referred to in the United States as the privilege against self-
incrimination is more frequently labeled the right to silence in Great Brit-
ain.5 Both designations encompass a set of rules which, in general, permit
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1. The self-incrimination privilege in the United States derives from the fifth amend-
ment's requirement that "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. In England the doctrine stems from a combination of
statutory and case law sources. Eg., Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., ch. 36, § I(a)
(defendant may not be called as a witness except upon his own application); R. v. Boyes, I B. &
S. 311, 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (Q.B. 1861) (reasonable ground to apprehend self-incrimination justi-
fies the court upholding a claim of privilege).
2. See infra notes 7-17 and accompanying text.
3. As an example in England, such a furor was raised about questioning practices in a
particular murder investigation that a special inquiry was made for the House of Commons.
Report of an Inquiry by the Hon. Sir Henry Fisher into the Circumstances Leading to the Trial
of Three Persons on Charges Arising Out of the Death of Maxwell Confait and the Fire at 27
Doggett Road, London SE6 (HC90 1977) [hereinafter cited as Confait Inquiry].
4. Fundamental self-incrimination reforms have been recommended by both the Royal
Commission on Criminal Procedure and the Criminal Law Revision Committee. Royal Com-
mission on Criminal Procedure, Report, Cmnd. 8092 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Royal Com-
mission Report]; Criminal Law Revision Committee, Eleventh Report, Eoidence (General),
Cmnd. 4991 (1972) [hereinafter cited as CLRC Report]. In the United States there have been
calls for reform from important commentators, L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT? (1959); Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change,
37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671 (1968), and even the enactment of a statute designed to reverse the
Supreme Court's Miranda warning requirements. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968, Title II, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 210 (1969) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1982)).
5. The self-incrimination privilege in Great Britain usually refers to the right of witnesses
to refuse to answer self-incriminatory questions. Se ARCHBOLD, CRIMINAL PLEADING, EvI-
DENCE AND PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES 1304 (40th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as
ARCHBOLD]; C. HAMPTON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 32-33 (1977); R. CROSS, EVIDENCE 275-82
(5th ed. 1979); G. WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT 38 (3d ed. 1963). See generally Greenawalt,
Perspectives on the Right to Silence, in CRIME, CRIMINOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY (R. Hood ed.
1974). The terms are used interchangeably hereafter to denote the set of related rules described
in the text rather than only the right of a witness to refuse to answer self-incriminatory inquiries.
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witnesses to refuse to answer self-incriminatory questions, allow a criminal
defendant to refuse to take the stand at his own trial, and provide special
protections for the suspect in police custody. The English and American
legal systems provide a core of protection in each of these areas.
Despite the common roots, similar general content, and equivalent im-
portance, there are important differences between British and American
views of the self-incrimination privilege which are particularly instructive.
Because the Americn privilege is constitutionalized in the fifth amendment,
reform tends to focus upon expanding or contracting the scope of the con-
trolling decisions of the United States Supreme Court. The British privilege,
in contrast, is a common law principle and therefore, in theory at least, more
readily subject to change. It has evolved in a distinctly British form and, due
to its common law foundations, is subject to re-evaluation even with respect
to its fundamental premises. Indeed, recent suggestions for self-incrimina-
tion reform in Great Britain demonstrate that even drastic changes are seri-
ously considered.
6
This article will discuss the intellectual and legal basis of recent
proprosals concerning self-incrimination in British law. Against the back-
drop of the history and controversial development of the British common
law self-incrimination privilege, these new proposals shed a great deal of
light on the basic assumptions behind the priviledge: this is true not only for
the British jurist but applies as well for any study or assessment of the Ameri-
can constitutional privilege.
I. THE HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
A substantial history of religious and political turmoil lies behind the
interrelated protections which comprise the self-incrimination privilege. In
seeking to deal with religious and political dissidents, both the Church and
Crown ir post-twelfth century England sought to make use of the inquisiti-
orial process to conduct their investigations. They employed proceedings
characterized by compelled submission to the oath ex ofio which obligated
individuals to answer truthfully all questions asked of them. Moreover, ad-
ministration of the oath ex ofici' was not burdened by requirements of a
formal accusation or sufficient evidence against a suspect. Instead, it was a
tool to ensnare the unwary and even force them to identify other potential
victims. Although its early use was confined to English ecclesiastical courts,
the system of compulsory interrogation found its way into civil courts and
achieved prominence in Star Chamber and High Commission proceedings. 7
Opposition to the use of the oath ex oflio combined elements of princi-
ple and practicality. Some believed compulsory interrogation was simply
unfair.8 Others, however, objected solely because the technique was success-
ful. This may have been the case for English Catholics who, after King
6. See supra note 4.
7. See genera/ly M. BERGER, TAKING THE FIFTH 1-23 (1980); L. LEvN,' ORIGINS OF THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 1 2250-2251 (1961); WILLIAMS, supra
note 5, at 38-45; Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seitsum Prodere, 5 HARV. L. REV. 71 (1892).
8. Maguire, Attack of the Common Lawyers on the Oath Ex Oftio as Administered in the Ecclesias-
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Henry VIII broke with the Catholic Church in Rome, found themselves vic-
timized by compulsory interrogation procedures similar to those they had
eagerly used against Protestants. 9 Similarly, after the defeat of the Spanish
Armada, and with it the threat of a Catholic restoration, Protestant heretics
increasingly became the subjects of Star Chamber and High Commission
inquisitorial investigations. Whether Catholic or Protestant, however, the
suspect in such a proceeding faced the dilemma of potential penalties for
either perjury or refusing to take the oath, or punishment for any criminal
offense revealed by virtue of responding truthfully to the questions asked.
Opponents of the oath ex offici'o found an important ally in the common
law courts which sought to restrain the utilization of the oath by issuing
writs of prohibition.' 0 The reassertion of royal prerogative effectively ended
this tactic, but could not stifle all dissent. Victims of High Commission and
Star Chamber proceedings, such as John Udal 1 I and John Lilburne,12 in-
voked the common law right of silence in refusing to answer questions or
even take the oath, their legal complaint being that compulsory interroga-
tion procedures were employed without formal accusation or presentment.
Ultimately, Parliament took the broader step of abolishing both the oath
procedure and the High Commission and Star Chamber courts which had so
effectively used it. 13
While these developments may have formally ended compelled ques-
tioning under oath by trial courts, the evolutionary process did not termi-
nate there. British law more generally moved toward the disqualification of
the defendant from being a witness at his own trial. Since he was prevented
from testifying it was naturally considered unfair to infer guilt from his si-
lence. Defendants, however, found they were able to hide behind compelled
silence and claim that they were prevented by law from establishing their
innocence. A balance was reached in the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898
which barred the defendant from being forced to testify at his own trial, but
allowed him to elect to take the witness stand in his own behalf.'4
The right of silence evolved somewhat more slowly outside of the trial
context. Even after compelled interrogations had ceased at trial, they re-
tical Courts in England, in ESSAYS IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL THEORY IN HONOR OF CHARLES
HOWARD MCILWAIN (1936).
9. During the reign of Henry VIII's daughter, Queen Mary, the oath ex ofticzo was exten-
sively used in an effort to restore the supremacy of Catholicism in England. LEVY, supra note 7,
at 73-82. The roles wre reversed after Queen Elizabeth I ascended to the throne. Id. at 98;
Kemp, The Background of the Fi)th Amendment in Enghh Law:. A Study of its Historical Implications, I
WM. & MARY L. REV. 247, 255-68 (1958).
10. BERGERsupra note 7, at 13-14. Sir Edward Coke himself obtained one such injunction,
Collier v. Collier, 4 Leonard 194, 74 Eng. Rep. 816 (1589), and wrote against the oath. Coke, Of
Oaths Before an Ecclesiastical Judge Ex Offio, 12 Coke 26, 77 Eng. Rep. 1308 (1607).
11. 1 Howell St. Tr. 1271 (1407); LEVY, supra note 7, at 150-51, 164-70.
12. 4 Howell St. Tr. 1269 (1649); 3 Howell St. Tr. 1315 (1637); BERGER, supra note 7, at
14-20.
13. In 1641, Parliament acted to abolish the High Commission and Star Chamber courts
and bar administration of the oath in ecclesiastical proceedings. 16 Car. ch. 10, 11 (1641).
After the Stuart restoration the oath was banned entirely. 13 Car. 2, ch. 12 (1662). Soon there-
after the courts began to extend the privilege of not answering incriminating questions to wit-
nesses. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250, at 290 (1961).
14. 61 & 62 Vict. ch. 36 (1898). See generaly BERGER, supra note 5, at 45-48.
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mained a feature of the preliminary examination performed by the Justice of
the Peace.15 This created the anomaly, before passage of the Criminal Evi-
dence Act, that the jury might be presented with the defendant's prelimi-
nary hearing confession, but the defendant would not be able to directly
testify as to his own version of the events. The problems were compounded
by the development of the modern police force which created further oppor-
tunities for obtaining incriminatory pretrial statements. Justices of the
Peace gradually assumed a more judicial role and the preliminary hearing
was turned into an examination of the evidence against the accused, rather
than an examination of him.' 6 To insure control of the extra-judicial inter-
rogation process, there evolved a requirement that confessions be voluntary
and fairly obtained.'
7
At the beginning of the twentieth century the essential components of
the English right to silence were well established. They were refined in sub-
sequent years, but not fundamentally changed. Calls for basic restructuring
have emerged, however, and been backed by prestigious sources. The suc-
ceeding controversy has been as much a political as a legal debate.
II. CONFESSIONS
A. Voluntariness
Before the advent of the right to silence, compelling the suspect to in-
criminate himself was standard procedure. Physical coercion in the form of
torture, and legal coercion represented by the oath ex offwio, were official
instruments of state policy.' 8 With the success of efforts to eliminate the
oath procedure, however, judicial coercion gradually ceased to exist. Trial
questioning was finally ended by the rule disqualifying the accused from
testifying at his own trial. Later, the judicialization of the functions of the
Justice of the Peace led to the abandonment of the interrogation of the ac-
cused at the preliminary hearing.
Although these developments did not directly affect the police, the re-
strictions upon judicial questioning did serve to create a sense of resistance to
police interrogation. Judge Cave observed:
The law does not allow the judge or the jury to put questions in
open court to prisoners; and it would be monstrous if the law per-
mitted a police officer to go, without anyone being present to see
how the matter was conducted, and put a prisoner through an ex-
amination, and then produce the effects of that examination
15. Two 16th century statutes required that the justice of the peace examine accused felons
brought before him. 1 & 2 Phil. & M. ch. 13 (1554); 2 & 3 Phil. & M. ch. 10 (1555).
16. BERGER, supra note 5, at 45; Home Office, Evidence to the Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure, Memorandum No. 9, The Law of Evidence in Criminal Proceedings, 7-
9 (1978) (all evidence to the Royal Commission Memoranda hereafter cited on file at the Insti-
tute for Advanced Legal Studies of the University of London) [hereinafter cited as Home Office
Evidence Memorandum].
17. See infta notes 26-59 and accompanying text.
18. BERGER, Supra note 5, at 12-13, 38-45. Initially, defendants were subjected topeizneforte
et dure to force them to plead to the charge. Failure to plead barred a trial and thus any chance




against him . . . It is no business of a policeman to put
questions. 19
Other courts sought to grant police slightly more leeway by permitting ques-
tioning once there was clear evidence that a crime had, in fact, been commit-
ted.20 Confusion remained, however, as to whether questioning could
proceed if the accused had been taken into custody, 2I and as to when per-
missible questioning became prohibited cross-examination of the defend-
ant. 22 Mr. Justice Hawkins, later Lord Brampton, offered cogent advice in
his Preface to the 1882 edition of Vincent's Police Code when he wrote that
"[p]erhaps the best maxim for a constable to bear in mind with respect to an
accused person is, 'keep your eyes and your ears open, and your mouth
shut.' "23
Despite resistance to the practice of interrogation, English courts gener-
ally admitted any resulting confession if it was found to be voluntary. Two
eighteenth century cases, R. v. Rudd 24 and R. v. Warwickshall,25 had estab-
lished that confessions resulting from threats or promises were entitled to no
weight. This principle evolved into the requirement that courts must ex-
clude involuntary confessions and was, in turn, applied to those police inter-
rogations which the courts ruled were permissible.
The English standard as to what constituted a voluntary confession
evolved in as confusing a manner as its American counterpart. 26 One of the
earliest expressions of the rule, in Warwtckshall, was based upon the objective
of protecting the reliability of the evidence against the accused. 27 The more
recent description, offered by Lord Sumner in R. v. Ibrahim, omits reference
to reliability as an issue, but is nevertheless similar in seeking to explain vol-
untariness by vaguely defining the contours of an involuntary confession:
19. R. v. Male and Cooper, (1893) 17 Cox C.C. 689, 690.
20. R. v. Crowe and Myerscough, (1917) 81 J.P. 288; R. v. Berriman, (1854) 6 Cox C.C.
388.
21. Compare R. v. Gavin, (1885) 15 Cox C.C. 656 with R. v. Miller, (1895) 18 Cox C.C. 54,
and R. v. Brackenbury, (1893) 17 Cox C.C. 628.
22. Gardner and Hancox, (1915) 11 Crim. App. 265.
23. Quoted in Home Office, Evidence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure,
Memorandum No. 5, The Law and Procedures Relating to the Questioning of Persons in the
Investigation of Crime 2 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Home Office Questioning Memorandum].
See also R. v. Knight and Thayre, (1905) 20 Cox C.C. 711.
24. (1775) 1 Leach 115, 168 Eng. Rep. 160.
25. (1793) 1 Leach 263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234.
26. Voluntariness is a prerequisite to the admissibility of confessions in the United States,
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), but it is a standard whose meaning is unclear and
whose development has been inconsistent. BERGER, supra note 7, at 104-12; 150-60. English
commentaries on the voluntariness standard can be found in ARCHBOLD, supra note 5, at 1
1377(A)(a)-(f, 1382-85; CROSS, supra note 5, at 541-45; Home Office Evidence Memorandum,
supra note 16, 1 28-37. See aLso D. FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS UNDER ENGLISH LAW
45-52 (1966); Kaci, Confessions.- A Comparison of Excuson Under Miranda in the United States and
Under the Judges' Rules in England, 10 AM. J. CRIM. L. 87 (1982).
27. Confessions are received in evidence, or rejected as inadmissible, under a consider-
ation whether they are or are not entitled to credit. A free and voluntary confession is
deserving of the highest credit, because it is presumed to flow from the strongest sense
of guilt, and therefore it is admitted as proof of the crime to which it refers; but a
confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear,
comes in so questionable a shape when it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt,
that no credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected.
R. v. Warwickshall, (1783) 1 Leach 263, 263-64, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 234-35.
1984]
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It has long been established as a positive rule of English criminal
law, that no statement by an accused is admissible in evidence
against him unless it is shown by the prosecution to have been a
voluntary statement, in the sense that it has not been obtained
from him either by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage exercised
or held out by a person in authority."
28
In 1963 the requirement was added that confessions obtained by oppression
must be excluded.
29
The early administration of the voluntariness rule was guided by the
condidions of the day. Almost every serious crime was punishable by death
or deportation at that time, and the police did not constitute an organized
group, could not be effectively watched, and were prone to abuse suspects to
gain admissions, 30 the judiciary was compelled to create artificial rules to
protect suspects from such abuse, especially considering the old rule prohib-
iting suspects from testifying on their own behalf.3 1 The attitude was one of
caution with respect to confessions obtained by the authorities, and in ex-
treme cases courts would view simple admonitions to tell the truth as suffi-
cient to render the confession inadmissible. 32 In contrast, the case law was
very inconsistent in its treatment of confessions to public officials,3 3 and the
voluntariness rule was deemed inapplicable to confessions made to individu-
als who were not in positions of authority.
34
Contemporary English confession law retains the 'person in authority'
requirement in assessing voluntariness, 35 and has resolved a number of re-
lated procedural issues.36 Nevertheless, the substance of the voluntariness
28. 1914 A.C. 599, 609. Lord Sumner's views were reaffirmed in Director of Pub. Prosecu-
tions v. Ping Lin, [1975] 3 All E.R. 175, and Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Harz and
Power, [1967] 1 A.C. 761. Lord Sumner's definition is also incorporated in section (e) of the
preamble to the Judges' Rules. Home Office Circular No. 89/1978, Judges' Rules and Adminis-
trative Directions to the Police, Preamble § (e) [hereinafter cited as Judges' Rules] reprinted in
Royal Commission Procedure Study, infra note 44, appendix 12.
29. Callis v. Gunn, [1963] 3 All. E.R. 677; [1964] 1 Q.B. 495. Oppression is also barred by
the Judges' Rules, supra note 28, § (e) (preamble to Rules).
30. Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Ping Lin, [1975] 3 All E.R. 175, 182 (Speech of Lord
Hailsham).
31. Id. Wariness of confessions was expressed by Judge Cave much earlier when he ob-
served that "for my part I always suspect these confessions, which are supposed to be the off-
spring of penitence and remorse, and which nevertheless are repudiated by the prisoner at the
trial." R. v. Thompson, [1893] 2 Q.B. 12, 18.
32. R. v. Kingston, (1830) 172 Eng. Rep. 752 ("You are under suspicion of this, and had
better tell all you know."). See also R. v. Partridge, (1836) 173 Eng. Rep. 243 ("I should be
obliged to you if you would tell us whit you know about it; if you will not, we of course can do
nothing; I shall be glad if you will.").
33. Ibrahim v. R, 1914 A.C. 599 (Confession admissible after suspect was asked "Why have
you done such a senseless act?"); R. v. Baldry, (1852) 169 Eng. Rep. 568 (confession admissible
after suspect warned of his right not to incriminate himself). Confessions following spiritual
admonitions were also admissible. R. v. Gilham, (1828) 1 Mood. 186, 168 Eng. Rep. 1235.
Inconsistencies are inevitable in light of the fact that the rule has "not been tightly defined in
law." The Fisher Report on the Confait Case.- Four Issues, 41 MOD. L. REV. 455, 460 (1978).
34. R. v. Moore, (1852) 2 Den. 522, 169 Eng. Rep. 1278; R. v. Upchurch, (1836) 1 Mood.
465, 168 Eng. Rep. 1346. Similarly, a confession induced by a hope of pardon, which authori-
ties had not created, would be admitted. Godinho [1911] 7 Crim. App. 12 (C.C.A.). See gener-
ally Mirfield, Confessions---the "Person in Authority" Requirement, 1981 CRIM. L. REV. 92.
35. R. v. Isequilla, [1975] 1 All. ER. 77; Deokinanan v. R., [1968] 2 All. E.R. 346.
36. The prosecution must establish the voluntariness of the confession beyond a reasonable
doubt, R. v. Sartori, Gavin and Phillips, 1961 CRIM. L. REV. 397, in contrast to the American
[Vol. 61:3
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standard remains ill-defined, and has produced some results which have gen-
erated criticism. 37 Threats and promises sufficient to render a confession
involuntary are largely a matter of perspective, dependent upon one's view
of the role of the voluntariness rule. If reliability alone is the objective, con-
fessions obtained by force and substantial threats would be excluded, 38 but
lesser pressures that do not necessarily produce unreliable confessions would
remain. 39 Similarly, inducements which currently lead to the exclusion of
confessions 40 may encourage a suspect to confess without substantial risk of
unreliability. English confession law, like its American counterpart, 4 1 has
moved beyond the reliability principle in a more general effort to control the
interrogation process. The Criminal Law Revision Committee labelled this
additional objective the disciplinary principle.
42
The voluntariness principal incorporates the disciplinary principle in
three major ways. First, it has taken an expansive view of the threats and
preponderance of the evidence standard, Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972). The challenge
is heard out of the presence of the jury in what the English call a trial within a trial. A decision
to exclude will mean that the jury will not hear evidence of the confession. If the confession is
ruled admissible, the jury may hear evidence relating to voluntariness in order to assess its
probative weight, Prasad v. The Queen, [19811 1 All E.R. 319; McCarthy, [1980] 70 Crim. App.
270, with an instruction that the prosecution has the burden of proof. R. v. Cave, [1963] Crim.
L. R. 371 (C.C.A.); Francis [1959] 43 Crim. App. 174 (C.C.A.). All testimony at the trial within
a trial is inadmissible as substantive evidence against the accused, as is the case in the United
States. Wong Kam-ming v. The Queen, [1979] 1 All E.R. 939; Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377 (1968). Both countries bar any use of involuntary confessions for cross-examination
purposes; Wong Kam-ming v. The Queen, [1979] 1 All E.R. 939; Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385 (1978), but the British exclusionary rule for involuntary confessions does not extend to
derivative evidence. King v. R., [1969] 1 A.C. 304; The King v. Warwickshall, (1783) 1 Leach
263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234. However, the prosecution must avoid introducing the evidence by
stating it was discovered as a result of what the defendant said, R. v. Berriman, (1854) 6 Cox
C.C. 388, although it has been observed that there is some conflict in the case law. CLRC
Report, supra note 4, at [ 69(i).
37. See Speech of Lord Hailsham, Director of Pub. Prosecution v. Ping Lin, [1975] 3 All.
E.R. 175, 183; Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at 4.73.
38. R. v. Fennell, (1881) 7 Q.B.D. 147; R. v. Parrott, (1831) 172 Eng. Rep. 1275. See also
Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Harz and Power, 1967 A.C. 761 (confession made
following threat of prosecution involuntary). Lord Widgery, C.J., observed that if a confession
"is induced by pressures or other influences [it] may be and often is thoroughly unreliable." R.
v. Isequilla, [1975] 1 All E.R. 77, 80.
39. In R. v. Smith, [1959] 2 All. E.R. 193, a Court Martial Appeal Court ruled that the
defendant's confession, made shortly after the sergeant-major had informed the company that
they would remain on parade until he found out who had been involved in a fighting incident,
was inadmissible. Documents produced by a defendant after being informed of the Inland
Revenue's practice of accepting monetary settlement in lieu of criminal prosecution where there
has been voluntary disclosure were ruled inadmissible in R. v. Barker, [1941] 3 All E.R. 33.
40. Northam, [1967] 52 Crim. App. 97 (suggestion of a break on other charges an improper
inducement); Zaveckas, [1969] 54 Crim. App. 202 (improper inducement in police affirmative
response to question of whether bail would be granted following statement). But see Houghton,
[1978168 Crim. App. 197 (no inducements found in context of statement made by defendant for
reward, but after being cautioned). More recently the Court of Appeal said that the practice of
discussing charge concessions with the defendant should be stopped but found no error in the
admission of the confession. R. v. Challinor and Cross, Times of London, October 12, 1982, at
8, col. 4.
41. The "aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evi-
dence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false."
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). See generally BERGER, supra note 7, at 108-10.
42. CLRC Report, supra note 4, at 55. The phrase has also been used by the Royal
Commission on Criminal Procedure, Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at 4.123, and
appeared in Lord Diplock's speech in R. v. Sang, [19791 2 All. E.R. 1222, 1230.
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inducements which will render a confessioto inadmissible.43 Second, the rule
independently bars the admission of confessions obtained by oppression.
44
Finally, the threat and inducements must come from a person in authority.45
Each of these developments cannot be explained solely on the basis of the
reliability objective. British courts have been regulating police behavior
through the use of the exclusionary rule despite the fact that this is not a
favored practice.
46
Although British courts may feel that in light of the well-established
character of the voluntariness rule, judicial revision would be inappropri-
ate,4 7 there are not written constitutional restraints barring legislative
change. Both the recent 1981 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure
Report 48 and the 1972 Evidence Report of the Criminal Law Revision Com-
mittee49 were thus left free to offer recommendations to recast the voluntari-
ness rule, and each sought changes which would have the effect of greatly
reducing opportunities for judicial exclusion of a defendant's statements to
police.
43. R. v. Isequilla, [1975] 1 All E.R. 77, 81-82. Judges have commented that the upgrad-
ing of the police has made the voluntariness rule "yet one more clog upon the efficient perform-
ance by the police of their duties." Northam, [1967] 52 Crim. App. 97, 104 (Winn, L.J.); and
that it was "designed to protect [the suspect] against dangers now avoided by other and more
rational means." Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Ping Lin. [19751 3 All E.R. 175, 182 (Lord
Hailsham).
44. See supra note 29. In R. v. Priestley, Judge Sachs stated that oppression "in the context
of the principles under consideration imports something which tends to sap, and has sapped,
that free will which must exist before a confession is voluntary." [1966] 50 Crim. App. 183, 51
Crim. App. 1 (note to case). In an address to the Bentham Club in 1968 Lord MacDermott
described oppressive questioning as that "which by its nature, duration, or other attendant
circumstances (including the fact of custody) excites hopes (such as the hope of release) or fears,
or so affects the mind of the subject that his will crumbles and he speaks when otherwise he
would have stayed silent." Quoted in Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, The Investi-
gation and Prosecution of Criminal Offenses in England and Wales: The Law and Procedure,
Cmnd. 8092-1, at 28 [hereinafter cited as Royal Commission Procedure Study]. See also R. v.
Prager, [19721 1 W.L.R. 260; Hudson, [1981] 72 Crim. App. 163. Lord Hailsham observed that
"any civilized system of criminal jurisprudence must accord to the judiciary some means of
excluding confessions or admissions obtained by improper methods." Wong Kam-Ming v. R.,
[1979] 2 W.L.R. 81, 90 (dissenting opinion).
45. The most recent reaffirmation appears in R. v. Rennie, Times of London, November 7,
1981, at 4, col. 1. Presumably, since inducements from other sources can have the same impact
as those from persons in authority, the requirement, therefore, suggests an objective of control-
ling the conduct of official interrogators. An inducement made in thepresence of a 'person in
authority', however, will suffice. Cleary, [1963] 48 Crim. App. 116.
46. This position was forcefully put by Lord Diplock in R. v. Sang, [1979] 2 All E.R. 1222,
1230:
It is no part of a judge's function to exercise disciplinary powers over the police or
prosecution as respects the way in which evidence to be used at the trial is obtained by
them. If it was obtained illegally there will be a remedy in civil law, if it was obtained
legally but in breach of the rules of conduct for the police, this is a matter for the
appropriate disciplinary authority to deal with.
47. The speeches of Lord Morris ("I do not think that a reconsideration or modification of
the rule lies within the province of judicial decision") and Lord Hailsham ("the rule has sur-
vived into the twentieth century, not only unmodified but developed, and only Parliament can
modify it now from the form in which it was given classical expression by Lord Sumner") in Ping
Lin reflect judicial unwillingness to tamper with the voluntariness standard. Director of Pub.
Prosecutions v. Ping Lin, [1975] 3 All E.R. 175, 179, 182.
48. The Commission was created by the Prime Minister. Royal Commission Report, supra
note 4, at 1.1.
49. CLRC Report, supra note 4.
RETHINKING SELF-INCRIMINA TION
The Royal Commission's position relied heavily upon empirical re-
search it had itself commissioned. Of particular importance was a psycholo-
gist's six-month observational study of interrogations conducted by the
Brighton Police Criminal Investigation Department. 50 The study's conclu-
sion was simply that the legal concept of voluntariness could not be utilized
meaningfully by a trained observer attempting to use psychological princi-
ples to categorize confessions obtained by police following interrogation. 5 1
Given the Royal Commission's conclusion that the legal definition of volun-
tariness was imprecise and offered little guidance to police, 52 the added evi-
dence of the variance of psychological and legal voluntariness 53 was
sufficient to warrant a new approach to confession admissibility.
The core of the Royal Commission's proposal was abandonment of the
voluntariness rule and the development, in its place, of a code of practice to
regulate the manner in which police interrogations could be conducted. The
object of the code would be to produce "conditions of interview that mini-
mize the risk of unreliable statements."' 54 It would focus on the circum-
stances and environments in which suspects could be questioned but, apart
from prohibiting threats of violence, torture, and inhuman or degrading
treatment, no attempt would be made to regulate interrogation tactics. 55
The drafting of the code was seen primarily as a Home Office responsibil-
ity,56 although this would inevitably entail input from the police. 5 7 Viola-
tion of code provisions involving violence, threats of violence, torture, or
inhuman or degrading treatment would lead to the automatic exclusion of
any confessions so obtained. 58 This was the only exception to the Royal
Commission's reluctance to use the law of evidence as a tool to deter police
misconduct, whether in the form of an automatic or reverse-onus exclusion-
ary rule. 59 In cases involving other breaches of the code of practices, it rec-
50. Irving, Police Interrogation: A Case Study of Current Practce, Royal Commission on Crimi-
nal Procedure Research Study No. 2, (1980) [hereinafter cited as Case Study]; Interview with
Walter Merricks, Commission Member (October 19, 1981); Interview with Dr. Michael Mc-
Conville, University of Birmingham (November 16, 1981). Observational data was also assem-
bled in a Home Office research study. Softley, Polce Interrogation: An Observational Study in Four
Police Stattons, Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure Research Study No. 4 (1980).
51. Case Study, supra note 50, at 136, 152; Interview with Barrie Irving (October 15, 1981).
52. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at 4.70-4.72.
53. Id. at 4.73.
54. Id. at 4.110.
55. Id. at 4.111-4.114. The Royal Commission suggested that appropriate subjects for
the code would include limits on night questioning; provision for refreshments; a ban on inter-
viewing persons substantially under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or who have been held
incommunicado beyond a specified period; and conditions of lighting, ventilation, and seating
for the interrogation. It believed that any attempt to regulate interrogation tactics would fail in
both the effort to define the impermissible tactics and in dealing with tactics that are implicit in
the suspect's situation even if not made explicit, such as a belief that a confession will lead to
bail.
56. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at 4.116.
57. Interviews with William Bohan, Criminal Policy Division, Home Office (October 16,
1981); Michael Wilmot, Solicitor's Branch, Metropolitan Police (October 20, 1981).
58. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at 4.132. Automatic exclusion was viewed
as necessary in light of the seriousness of the breach of such rules and society's abhorrence of
violent and degrading conduct.
59. The Royal Commission questioned the effectiveness of an automatic exclusionary rule,
citing Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHi. L. REV. 665 (1970), but
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ommended a remedy tied to the reliability goal underlying the code. Where
there has been such a breach
[t]he judge should point out to the jury or the magistrates be ad-
vised of the dangers involved in acting upon a statement whose
reliability can be affected by breach of the code. They should be
informed that under pressure a person may make an incriminating
statement that is not true, that the code has been introduced to
control police behavior and minimize the risk of an untrue state-
ment being made and that if they are satisfied that a breach of the
code has occurred it can be dangerous to act upon any statement
made; accordingly, they should look for independent support for it,
before relying upon it.6°
More direct enforcement of the code would derive from police internal su-
pervision and the complaint procedure.
6 1
Reliability had also been the linchpin of the 1972 Criminal Law Revi-
sion Committee recommendations. In its Evidence Report, the Committee
called for the retention of the exclusionary rule with respect to statements
obtained as a result of oppressive treatment of the accused, but sought to
alter the rule of automatic exclusion for statements obtained as a result of
threats or inducements. In its place the Committee recommended that only
those statements obtained as a result of threats or inducements likely to pro-
duce an unreliable confession should be excluded.
6 2
The Criminal Law Revision Committee's proposals were based upon
the utilitarian view that the object of the criminal process is to achieve the
"right result," but its entire report was abandoned largely as a result of the
furor generated by its call for the restructuring of the right to silence. 63 Well
aware of the fate of the Committee's efforts, 64 the Royal Commission chose
instead to rely upon the concept of the need for a proper balance between
the liberties of the individual and the interests of the whole community.
65
was itself criticized for confusing the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule in the quite differ-
ent contexts of interrogations and searches. Inman, The Admissibility ofConfessions, 1981 CRIM.
L. REV. 469, 475. It also raised questions as to the appropriateness of spending more court time
on matters not related to the guilt or innocence of the accused. Royal Commission Report,
supra note 4, at 4.128. A reverse-onus exclusionary rule, which would place the burden on the
prosecution to justify the non-exclusion of illegally obtained confessions, was seen to reflect the
same problems as well as lacking the certainty needed to adequately guide police. Id. at
4.129-4.131.
60. Id. at 1 4.133.
61. Id. at 1 4.118.
62. CLRC Report, supra note 4, at 65. In line with its reliability focus, the Committee
would allow the fruit of inadmissible confessions to be introduced. Id. at T 68. The fact that the
truth of an inadmissible confession is confirmed by evidence subsequently discovered, however,
would not justify its admission, although the jury could be informed that derivative evidence
was discovered as a result of a statement made by the accused. Id. at 69.
63. CLRC Report, supra note 4, at 1 27; Gerstein, The Se/f-Incrimiation Debate tn Great Brit-
ain, 27 AM. J. COMp. L. 81 (1979); JUSTICE, Report of Conference on the Report of the Royal
Commission on Criminal Procedure, April 11, 1981, at 10 (Comments of Professor Michael
Zander); Interview with Charles Morrison, Q.C., Dean of the Inns of Court School of Law
(September 24, 1981).
64. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at $ 1.24-1.31.
65. Id. at $1 1.11-1.12; Inner Temple, Conference on Questioning and the Rights of the
Suspect, September 26, 1981 [hereinafter cited as Inner Temple Conference] (Remarks of Wal-
ter Merricks, Member of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure).
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Each, however, felt that the contemporary voluntariness rule was an inap-
propriate standard and developed a formula which would have the unmis-
takeable effect of increasing the number of confessions reaching the jury.
The Royal Commission would allow all confessions to reach the jury, exclud-
ing only those obtained under the most extreme conditions, and with only a
judicial warning in the event of a breach of the code of practice. The Crimi-
nal Law Revision Committee's proposal was to exclude only confessions ob-
tained as as result of oppressive questioning or tactics likely to result in an
unreliable statement. The goals of insuring the accuracy of the trial's out-
come and balancing individual and societal interests were seen to call for
looser evidentiary controls on the interrogation process.
Suggestions that reliable confessions be admitted against the accused as
long as the methods used to obtain them are not extreme, are very much in
keeping with the British preference for avoiding the use of evidentiary rules
to discipline police. 66 The exception for extreme tactics, where both the
Royal Commission and Criminal Law Revision Committee recommended
automatic exclusion, is largely consistent with the reliability objective since
any resulting confessions would have a high risk of unreliabilty. Despite the
fact that both proposals received support from some quarters, 6 7 most of the
reaction has been either cautious 68 or openly hostile.69 Much of the opposi-
tion was based on the view that the proposals were vague in failing to specify
either the circumstances likely to produce unreliable confessions under the
Criminal Law Revision Committee model or the content of the code of inter-
rogation practices proposed by the Royal Commission. Others concluded
that even without such details the elimination of the voluntariness test would
66. See supra note 45. Interview with Sir David Napley, former President, Law Society
(December 3, 1981).
67. Not surprisingly, police groups supported relaxed confession admissibility rules in evi-
dence presented to the Royal Commission. Association of Chief Police Officers of England,
Wales, and Northern Ireland, Evidence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 7.76
(1978); Police Superintendents' Association of England and Wales, Written Evidence to the
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 5.20 (1978). Others also reacted favorably to the
Royal Commission's suggestions. Interview with Judge John Buzzard, Central Criminal Court
(November 18, 1981). Supporters of the Criminal Law Revision Committee's recommendations
included Professor Rupert Cross and Sir David Napley. Cross, The Evidence Report: Sense or Non-
sense, 1973 CRIM. L. REV. 329, 354; Interview with Sir David Napley (December 3, 1981).
68. In the case of the Royal Commission recommendations, the lack of the details of the
proposed code of practices led some to reserve judgment on the acceptability of eliminating the
voluntariness rule. JUSTICE, Comments on the Home Office Consultative Memorandum, at 8
(1981) (The Home Office Consultative Memorandum sought comments on issues raised by the
Royal Commission Report); Interview with Michael Wilmot, Solicitor's Branch, Metropolitan
Police (September 20, 1981).
69. Law Society, Memorandum ofthe Council ofthe Law Society on the Royal Commission s Report
2, 29 (1981); Law Society and Bar Council, Memorandum by the Law Sociey and Bar Council on
Certain of the Recommendations of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 5 (1981); 5 RIGHTS
(Journal of the National Council for Civil Liberties) 4 (1981); Interviews with Neil Denison,
Q.C., Secretary, Criminal Bar Association (September 22, 1981), Richard DuCann, Q.C., for-
mer Chairman of the Bar of England and Wales (November 11, 1981), Peter Archer, M.P.
(November 17, 1981). The Labour Party position appeared to be that a reverse-onus exclusion-
ary rule should apply to improperly obtained statements. House of Commons Debate, Novem-
ber 19, 1981, at 538 (Comments of Roy Hattersley, M.P.). It has been suggested that lawyers




simply reduce already existing protections for the accused.7 °
One reason for the differing positions on proposals to replace the volun-
tariness rule is the fundamental question of how much rules of evidence
should be used for deterrent purposes. The same issue permeates debates on
the American exclusionary rule.71 Closely related are the differing percep-
tions as to the frequency of police malpractice, the utility of alternative rem-
edies for police misconduct, and the likely success of utilizing the
exclusionary rule for this purpose.72 There is also no consensus as to which
interrogation tactics, short of the extreme, are either improper or likely to
produce unreliable statements. Police may be able to overcome resistance
and secure a confession through persuasion and pressure, but is this necessar-
ily bad or likely to produce unreliable evidence? The opponents of the vol-
untariness rule proposals appear to have a different view of how the British
criminal justice system operates in practice and differ in their vision of how it
should function. Whether the proposals to alter the voluntariness rule will
be adopted by Parliment, and in what form cannot be predicted. It does
appear, however, that such an effort will be undertaken by the current
government.
73
B. The Caution and Silence
One of the central premises of the common law of confessions is that a
suspect has no obligation to give a statement to the police. Lord Parker's
description of this principle in Rice v. Connol/y74 reflects the generally ac-
cepted view that:
though every citizen has a moral duty or, if you like, a social duty
to assist the police, there is no legal duty to that effect, and indeed
the whole basis of the common law is the right of the individual to
refuse to answer questions put to him by persons in authority.
75
The voluntariness rule is consistent with this because the lack of an obliga-
70. Inner Temple Conference, supra note 65 (Remarks of Harriet Harmon, Legal Officer,
National Council for Civil Liberties).
71. See The Exclusionmy Rule Bills: Hearings on S 101 and S 751 Before the Senate Subcomm. on
Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judicia, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1981).
72. Judges may tend to view themselves as presently doing an adequate job of protecting
the rights of the accused. Interviews with Lord Justice Eveleigh, Member of the Royal Com-
mission on Criminal Procedure (November 19, 1982), Lord Justice Lawton (October 13, 1981);
Judge John Buzzard, Central Criminal Court (November 18, 1981). Some barristers also feel
that court supervision of the voluntariness standard has been improving. Interviews with Neil
Denison, Q.C., Secretary, Criminal Bar Association (September 22, 1981); Richard DuCann,
Q.C., former Chairman of the Bar of England and Wales (November 11, 1981). A sign that
there were major problems in the interrogation process, however, was the recognition by the
police themselves that their testimony as to oral confessions, the so-called police verbals, was not
being believed. Interview with Michael Wilmot, Solicitors Branch, Metropolitan Police (Octo-
ber 20, 1981). One commentator observed that the Royal Commission lacked "a sense of street-
wisdom, and a practical application of how copybook safeguards get blotted in police cells and
in courtrooms." The Guardian, November 20, 1981, p. 15, col. 1.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 253-87.
74. [1966] 2 Q.B. 414.




tion to answer police questions does not mean that an individual should be
prevented from voluntarily deciding to provide information.
Because it is the English prosecutor's duty to establish the voluntariness
of the accused's confession beyond a reasonable doubt,76 he is confronted
with the problem of assembling the necessary evidence to meet the burden of
proof requirement. The practice of cautioning suspects of their right to re-
main silent prior to interrogation grew as a procedure enabling the prosecu-
tion to meet this evidentiary burden. 77 Due to uncertainty as to whether a
caution was required, however, the Chief Constable of Birmingham wrote to
the Lord Chief Justice in 1906 asking for clarification. In response, he was
informed that a caution should precede questioning if the officer had deter-
mined that the suspect should be charged. Later the judges of the Kings'
Bench were asked to draw up guides for police interrogation, and the result
was the first set of Judges' Rules in 1912.78 Changes were made at various
points, and the current Judges' Rules, with accompanying Home Office Ad-
minstrative Directions, were issued in 1978. 79
The Judges' Rules incorporate the voluntariness principle,8 0 but pro-
vide regulation of the interrogation process well beyond the principles mini-
mal dictates. The Rules are not viewed as having the status of law, 8' and a
violation of one of the rules or accompanying administrative directions does
not lead to the automatic exclusion of any statement thereafter obtained.82
As one court observed, "their non-observance may, and at times does, lead to
the exclusion of an alleged confession; but ultimately all turns on the judge's
decision as to whether, breach or no breach, it has been shown to have been
made voluntarily."'83 How frequently the discretion to exclude confessions is
exercised is subject to some disagreement.
8 4
The cautioning of suspects plays a central role in the structure of the
Judges' Rules, but the obligation to administer the caution does not arise
immediately. Pursuant to Rule II:
As soon as a police officer has evidence which would afford reason-
able grounds for suspecting that a person has committed an of-
fence, he shall caution that person or cause him to be cautioned
before putting to him any questions, or further questions, relating
76. R. v. Cave, 1963 CRIM. L. REV. 371; R. v. Sartori, 1961 CRIM. L. REV. 397.
77. P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 32 (1960).
78. The 1912 Judges' Rules are reproduced in R. v. Voisin, [1918] 1 K.B. 531, 539 n.3.
The historical evolution of the Judges' Rules appears in Royal Commission Procedure Study,
supra note 43, app. 13, at 162-65.
79. Judges' Rules, supra note 28.
80. Judges' Rules, supra note 28, Preamble § (e).
81. Archbold, supra note 5, at 1388 E.; Home Office Questioning Memorandum, supra
note 23, at [ 22.
82. Conway v. Hotten, [19761 2 All E.R. 213; R. v. Collier, [1965] 3 All E.R. 136; Com-
ment, R. v. Roberts, 1970 CRIM. L. REV. 464 (C.A.); Voisin, [1918] 13 Crim. App. 89.
83. Prager, [1971] 56 A. App. R. 151, 160.
84. Courts have not been inclined to exercise their discretion to exclude evidence as a
means of disciplining the police. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at 4.124. One
Commission member believed that the discretion to exclude was so infrequently exercised that it
could be safely removed. Interview with Walter Merricks (October 19, 1981). Others, however,




to that offence.8 5
The evidentiary standard triggering the duty to caution in form and practice
parallels the standard required for an arrest.8 6 Under Rule I, questioning
before this point may proceed without a caution, but, when "reasonable
grounds to suspect" arise, the individual must be informed: "You are not
obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so but what you say may be
put into writing and given in evidence." If the investigation proceeds to the
point where an individual is charged with or informed that he may be prose-
cuted for an offense, Rule III(a) requires that he be cautioned in the same
form as Rule II, prefaced by the question "Do you wish to say anything?"
However, Rule III(b) generally precludes any further interrogation:
It is only in exceptional cases that questions relating to the offence
should be put to the accused person after he has been charged or
informed that he may be prosecuted. Such questions may be put
where they are necessary for the purpose of preventing or minimiz-
ing harm or loss to some other person or the public or for clearing
up an ambiguity in a previous answer or statement.
8 7
Furthermore, a caution must precede any such questioning.8 8
To an American observer, the differences between the Miranda warning
requirements and the obligation to caution imposed by the Judges' Rules are
readily apparent. In particular, the English warning is far less detailed and
exclusion of evidence obtained without a caution is discretionary. More sig-
nificant is the fact that Miranda's rather demanding waiver requirements are
not part of the British system, and thus police in Great Britain feel free to
attempt to persuade suspects to answer questions and do not necessarily take
no for an answer.8 9 There are similarities as well. There is an investigatory
period in both systems in which questioning may proceed without a warning
or caution, and the obligation to inform the suspect of his rights arises coinci-
dent with the assertion of custodial authority. Similarly, the standards in-
crease when the process becomes more adversarial and the prosecution phase
commences.
9 °
The most controversial of the recent recommendations for changing the
British right to silence sought a fundamental restructuring of the restraints
upon police interrogation and the very right of suspects not to respond to
police questions. The Criminal Law Revision Committee proposed that,
while silence in the face of police questioning should not consistitute an of-
85. Judges' Rules, supra note 28,'at p. 154.
86. Criminal Evidence Act, 1967 s.2. The current standard reflects a change from the pre-
1964 rules which focused upon the point where a police officer "has made up his mind to charge
a person with a crime." P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 28 (1960).
87. Judges' Rules, supra note 28, at 154.
88. Given the lack of support for post-charging interrogation, one might expect police to
delay the charging decision. Although this has been held a violation of the Judges' Rules, re-
sulting statements are not excluded. The only incentive for police to comply is the fear that the
defendant may claim the violation rendered the statement involuntary, and the risk the jury
will believe the claim. R. v. MacIntosh, Times of London, October 8, 1982, at 9, col. 5.
89. Interview with Barrie Irving (October 15, 1981).
90. P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 27 (1960); Zander, The Right of




fense, it should be subject to a wider array of adverse consequences. More-
.over, substantial changes in the police caution were proposed to insure that
suspects would be made aware of the consequences of exercising their right
to silence. This plan became the central focus of the debate over the Crimi-
nal Law Revision Committee's Evidence Report and led to its downfall. 9 1
The Committee's proposals came against the background of a number
of confusing decisions delineating the limits of judicial comment on the ac-
cused's pretrial silence. A number of rulings had barred the suggestion of
adverse inferences of guilt in cases involving post-caution silence. 92 Other
cases, however, distinguished an inference of guilt from notifying the jury
that a defense was advanced for the first time at trial and inviting them to
consider that fact in assessing its weight. 93 A Privy Council ruling had re-
jected the distinction between pre and post-caution silence 94 and the Crimi-
nal Law Revision Committee assumed that the prohibition against drawing
an adverse inference from silence existed independently of the caution. 95 A
more recent court ruling suggests that the current law bars even a comment
that a defense was first raised at trial. In R. v. Gilbert, the court observed that
the current law is that the judge "must not comment adversely on the ac-
cused's failure to make a statement. '9 6  Additionally, in a 1976 decision,
doubt was cast on the Privy Council's view that pre and post-caution silence
should be treated the same, 97 and the Criminal Law Revision Committee
believed that the law would permit consideration of precaution silence in
assessing the accused's evidence.
98
The specific form that the Committee's recommendation took was the
proposal that:
If the accused has failed, when being interrogated by anyone
charged with the duty of investigating offenses or charging offend-
ers, to mention a fact which he afterwards relies on at the commit-
tal proceedings or the trial, the court or jury may draw such
inferences as appear proper in determining the question before
them. The fact would have to be one which the accused could
reasonably have been exprected to mention at the time.99
91. Home Office Questioning Memorandum, supra note 23, at J 41, 129; Zander, supra
note 90, at 344.
92. Davis, [1959] 43 Crim. App. 215; Leckay, [1943] 2 All. E.R. 665; Naylor, [1933] 1 K.B.
685.
93. Ryan, [1964] 50 Crim. App. 144; Littleboy, [1934 2 K.B. 408. Great Britain now
requires advance notice of an alibi defense.
94. Hall v. R., [1971] 1 All E.R. 322.
95. CLRC Report, supra note 4, at 29.
96. [1977] 66 Crim. App. 237, 245.
97. R. v. Chandler, [1976] 3 All E.R. 105.
98. CLRC Report, supra note 4, at 80. Exactly when permissible comments on the
weight of the evidence become prohibited suggestions of an adverse inference of guilt is difficult
to discern from the case law. Compare R. v. Gerard, [1948] 1 All E.R. 205 and Tune, [1944] 29
Crim. App. 162 (permissible comments) wth Sullivan, [1966] 51 Crim. App. 102 [and] Hoare,
[1966] 50 Crim. App. 166 (prohibited comments). Where the accused and accuser are on an
equal footing, i.e., the accuser is not a member of the police, silence in the face of an accusation
may constitute evidence of guilt. Parkes v. R., [1976] 3 All E.R. 380; R. v. Christie, 1914 A.C.
545.
99. CLRC Report, supra note 4, at 32.
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The totality of the circumstances would determine whether an adverse infer-
ence would be warranted in light of the nature of the defense and the sus-
pect's explanation for failure to mention it. The adverse inference could be
drawn even in a committal proceeding which has as its purpose determining
whether to commit the accused for trial.' ° Similarly, at trial, the adverse
inference could be used not only in the determination of the accused's guilt,
but also in assessing whether a submissible case had been made.10 1
The Committee recognized that its proposals were inconsistent with the
warnings required by the Judges' Rules. Rules 1 and 2, in particular, create
a sense in the mind of the suspect that he is not obligated to answer police
questions. The possibility of adverse inferences being drawn from his failure
to mention any relevant fact is a consideration that logically should be
weighed by the individual in deciding whether or not to exercise his right to
silence. A defendant could claim that the caution led him to believe there
would be no comment on his silence and thus no adverse inference should be
drawn. To remedy this, the Committee recommended a new caution:
You have been charged with [informed that you may be prose-
cuted for]-. If there is any fact on which you intend to rely in
your defense in court, you are advised to mention it now. If you
hold back until you go to court, your evidence may be less likely to
be believed and this may have a bad effect on your case in general.
If you wish to mention any fact now, and you would like it written
down, this will be done.502
Significantly, the caution would be administered only after an accused was
charged or officially informed that he would be prosecuted. No such advice
would have to be given at earlier stages of the investigation.' 0 3 A minority of
the Committee, however, urged that the application of the entire proposal be
delayed until a regular process of tape recording of confessions had been
instituted by the police.' 4
The reactions to the Criminal Law Revision Committee's proposal were
overwhelmingly negative.' 0 5 The Royal Commission on Criminal Proce-
dure, despite some sympathies for the Criminal Law Revision Committee's
proposals, chose to recommend no change in the existing law on the right to
silence in police questioning. 0 6 The Royal Commission took this position
despite support for the Criminal Law Revision Committee's proposals from
police and prosecutor groups,' 0 7 and criticisms expressed by the Law Society
100. Id. at 36.
101. Id. at 39. If corroboration is required, the Committee also proposed to allow the
adverse inference to be used to meet this evidentiary obligation. Id. at 40.
102. Id. at 44.
103. Id. As previously indicated, after charging the Judges' Rules permit asking the accused
if he has anything further to say, but discourage further detailed interrogation. See supra note 86
and accompanying text. The Committee chose not to directly address the caution required in
the limited circumstances of post-charging interrogation under Rule (b). CLRC Report, supra
note 4, at $ 43 n.I.
104. Id. at 52.
105. Zander, The CLRC Evidence Report-A Survey of Reactions, 1974 LAw Soc. GAZETTE 954.
106. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at $ 4.53.
107. Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland, Evidence
to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 9 7.38-7.45 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Chief
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and Criminal Bar Association calling for less extreme modifications of the
right to silence in police questioning. 0 8
The Commission recognized that cases calling for adverse inferences
under the Criminal Law Revision Committee's proposals would be few in
number. These cases would involve only those in which the accused did not
plead guilty, did not make a damaging admission nor confession to the po-
lice, and attempted for the first time to offer a defense at trial. The Commis-
sion was concerned that in spite of this, cautions would have to be given to
every suspect.' 0 9 This policy, in turn, might affect the way the police would
conduct all their interviews," 0 and could only serve to add to the pressure
on the suspect to answer police questions. The result would be a risk that
even innocent individuals would make damaging admissions in the face of a
warning that silence would be to their detriment. There was also concern
that the effect of a system of adverse inferences would constitute a subtle
shifting of the burden of proof, a particularly inappropriate result where the
questioning might be based on unsubstantiated and vague allegations or on
mere suspicion."' Finally, concern was expressed that the system of adverse
inferences from silence might lead to frequent factual disputes as to whether
the individual remained silent. The resulting administrative burden could
well be unmanageable."12
The Royal Commission did not exhaustively consider the viability of
alternatives suggested to it. The Criminal Bar Association, for example, rec-
ommended that at the committal stage of the proceedings the defendant
should be invited to make any disclosure of facts relating to his defense and
that his failure to do so could be considered in assessing credibility, but not
as evidence of guilt or as corroboration of the prosecution evidence where
such is required. Comments to this effect could be made to the jury by both
the judge and the prosecuting counsel." 3 The defendant's duty to produce
relevant facts would arise only after the prosecution had revealed at the
committal proceedings the facts supporting the charge." 4 Thus, the Crimi-
nal Bar Association's proposals were responsive to both concerns voiced by
the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure. The Criminal Bar Associa-
Police Officers Evidence]; Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Part I of the Written Evi-
dence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 1 4.13 (1978); Prosecuting Solicitors'
Society of England and Wales, Evidence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 27-
29 (1978).
108. Criminal Bar Association, Written Submission No. I to the Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure 11 52-67 (1978); Law Society, Police Powers and Rights of Suspects 11 58-
62 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Law Society Evidence].
09. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at T 4.49.
110. Id. at 4.50. The Commission added that it would affect pre as well as post-caution
interrogations.
11. Id. at 4.51-4.52.
112. Id. at 4.52.
113. Criminal Bar Association, Written Submission No. I to the Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure pt. 2, 1 52-68 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Bar Evidence]. This was a reaf-
firmation of the position taken by the Bar in 1973. Strong sentiment for a revised procedure
after the completion of initial police investigation was also noted by the Senate of the Inns of
Court and the Bar in its Submission to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure at 5
(1979).
114. Bar Evidence, supra note 113, at pt. 2, T 59.
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tion avoided risking a subtle shift in the burden of proof by rejecting the use
of adverse inferences from failure to provide the relevant facts of a defense as
evidence of guilt, and limiting its use to credibility questions. In short, the
prosecution could not make its case by relying on the silence of the accused.
Under the Criminal Bar Association proposals the stage at which the infor-
mation would have to be provided arose after the conclusion of the initial
police interrogation practices. The police could not use the immediate shock
of arrest coupled with the caution proposed by the Criminal Law Revision
Committee to obtain an early incriminating admission from the accused.
The Law Society offered somewhat more specific suggestions on the
right to silence during pretrial investigation. They viewed the existing right
to silence as contrary to common sense and unfairly favoring those who are
criminally experienced and likely to be guilty. 15 It proposed that:
[I]f a defendant exercises his right not to answer questions or if he
fails to give an explanation consistent with his innocence which one
might reasonably expect him to have volunteered the trial judge
and the prosecution (by cross-examination or in its final address)
should be entitled to comment thereon to the extent that such mat-
ters go to the credibility of the defendant."1
6
As was the case for the Criminal Bar Associations proposals, the Law Society
recommendations did not go so far as to authorize adverse use of the defend-
ants silence during interrogation for purposes of proving his guilt or as cor-
roboration. The Law Society proposal also rejected implementation unless
there existed effective sanctions against abuse by the police.' I In this way
the Law Society felt that it had satisfactorily resolved the two major obsta-
cles to adverse use of silence; specifically the concern that it would shift the
burden of proof and encourage police abuse during the interrogation pro-
cess. The Law Society also drafted a revised caution to reflect its recom-
mended changes"' and observed that it would be in police interest to
adminster the caution at an early stage since its position was that adverse
comment upon silence prior to the administration of the caution, would not
be permitted. " 19 The Law Society called for further cautioning either imme-
diately before or immediately after charging.120 Believing that the Royal
115. Law Society Evidence, supra note 108, at 54-55.
116. Id. at 58(b).
117. Id. at 58-59.
118. Id. at 64.
I suspect that you may be involved in an offence of [burglary]. I am going to ask you
some questions. If you are later prosecuted, your answers to my questions will be
given in evidence and your answers should be truthful and accurate.
You are not compelled to answer the questions but I must warn you that, if you
fail to do so, a court may be less likely to accept as true any evidence you give at the
trial.
You should also tell me of anything which you think is in your favour because, if
you do not, the court may be unwilling to accept as true any evidence you give at the
trial concerning matters you have not told me about now.
Do you wish to consult a solicitor? If so, I will try to arrange for you to see one
before I question you.
Id.
119. Id. at 65.
120. After informing the suspect that he has been or will be charged with an offense, the
officer should state:
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Commission on Criminal Procedure had failed to provide for sufficient safe-
guards, particularly with respect to the accuracy of the interrogation, the
Law Society recommended against modifications of the right to silence in its
review of the Royal Commission's Report.'
2'
With so much support for modifications of the right to silence during
police investigation 122 it is perhaps surprising that the Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure entirely avoided venturing into this area. Even though
the proposals of the Criminal Law Revision Committee had been soundly
rejected, compromises were nevertheless available. As both the Bar Council
and Law Society recommended, adverse inferences could have been limited
to credibility questions, thus avoiding the objection that silence should not
be used to shift the burden of proof to the defendant which the Criminal
Law Revision Committee arguably did in recommending the use of silence
as proof of guilt and corroboration. Moreover, the triggering point for such
inferences could be deferred past the initial police investigatory phase, thus
ensuring that only those against whom there was reasonable suspicion would
be subjected to it. The wording of the caution could be modified from the
format suggested by the Criminal Law Revision Committee to minimize its
arguably threatening character. Additionally, a strong argument can be
made that it is morally approriate to draw inferences from silence in appro-
priately controlled situations.' 23 Absent a recommendation from an entity
with the prestige of the Royal Commission, however, it is unlikely that
changes in this aspect of right to silence in England will be forthcoming.
The previous recommendations of the Criminal Law Revision Committee,
I told you at an earlier stage that it was important that you should tell me of anything
you believed to be in your favour. If there is anything you have not told me already,
you should tell me now. If you wish, you can make a written statement and, although
I can write it for you, it would be better if you yourself write it out.
Id. at 68.
121. Law Society, Memorandum by the Council of the Law Society on the Royal Commis-
sion's Report 5.13 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Law Society Memorandum]. Following the
issuance of the Royal Commission Report, the Bar Council also changed its position and sup-
ported the recommendation that there be no change in the right to silence. Law Society and
Bar Council, Memorandum by the Law Society and Bar Council on Certain of the Recommen-
dations of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure at 4 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Law
Society and Bar Council Memorandum].
122. Of course, this was not a unanimous position. One group urged retention of the ex-
isting right to silence, fearing added pressure on suspects to answer questions whose meaning
was equivocal. A further concern was raised as to whether suspects would appreciate the full
significance of the questions. The point was also made that the suspect's silence might be due to
reasons unrelated to the subject under investigation. London Criminal Courts Solicitors' Asso-
ciation, Evidence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 5 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Solicitors' Assoc.].
123. Professor Greenawalt has persuasively developed this argument and concluded that
"although adverse inferences are proper when a person refuses to respond to questions based on
substantial evidence of his wrongdoing, those who bear responsibility for determining guilt
should not be allowed to draw such inferences from silence that has occurred before substantial
evidence of wrongdoing exists." Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutlnal Right, 23 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 15, 43 (1981). Yet, questions remain as to the evidentiary connection between
silence and either guilt or the suspect's credibility. See Solicitors' Assoc.,supra note 122. If it is a
weak one, silence may simply not be probative. Even if the connection exists, the nature of the
custodial environment arguably should not lead to adverse inferences from silence. Greenawalt,
supra note 123, at 65. Further consideration of the implications of adverse inferences of guilt as
opposed to credibility are also called for.
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even though rejected in England, nevertheless have influenced the law in
members of the British Commonwealth.
124
C. Interrogation Before a Magistrate and Other Accuracy Controls
In addition to proposals for reform of existing self-incrimination princi-
ples, the English have also considered the merits of more fundamental
change in the system of justice. This has included evaluation of continental
criminal procedure systems and the inquisitorial procedures they utilize as
an alternative model for governing the acquisition of information from an
accused. In France, for example, ajuge d'instruction conducts an official in-
quiry to determine the suspect's guilt. Questioning of the accused is an es-
sential component of this procedure. Instead of relying upon the
accusatorial contest between the prosecution and the defense, the inquisito-
rial process offers a model of active judicial control over the investigation
process. Although there is some question as to the effectiveness of judicial
controls over investigative activities, the inquisitorial model nevertheless pre-
fers a different format for, and emphasis on, the interrogation of the
accused. '
25
Because of the radical change that adoption of inquisitorial procedures
would entail, British self-incrimination reform proposals have instead been
premised upon retention of the existing adversarial process.' 26 Nevertheless,
124. The Privy Council considered an appeal from Singapore which had enacted some of
the Criminal Law Revision Committee recommendations. Haw Tua Tau v. Public Prosecutor,
[1981] 3 W.L.R. 395 (Singpore). See Meng Heong Yeo, Diminishing the Right to Silence. The
Singapore Experience, 1983 CRIM. L. REV. 89.
125. The advantages of contemporary inquisitorial procedures are explored in L. WEINREB,
DENIAL OF JUSTICE 117-46 (1977). In Professor Weinreb's view, police responsibilities should
primarily be those relating to peacekeeping and general emergency services, and that these are
inconsistent with other demands placed upon them to act "judiciously, with discretion, and
mindful of conflicting interest" in performing their investigative duties. Id. at 120. His solution
is the creation of an office of an investigating magistracy. However, the effectiveness of such a
system in supervising the investigation process is itself subject to dispute. Compare, Goldstein
and Marcus, The Myth ofJudicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial" Systems: France, Italy, and Ger-
many, 87 YALE L.J. 240 (1977) and Goldstein and Marcus, Comment on Continental Criminal Proce-
dure, 87 YALE L.J. 1570 (1978) with Langbein and Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: 'Myth'
and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549 (1978). The distinctions between inquisitorial and accusatorial
procedures are explored in Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 506 (1973).
126. The Criminal Law Revision Committee took as an underlying assumption that the
English adversary system would not be replaced by inquisitorial process where "there is a full
judicial investigation of the whole case, including that for the defense, before the trial and at the
trial the judge questions the accused from the report of the investigation." CLRC Report, supra
note 4, at $ 13. In the Committee's judgment such a change could not be made piecemeal and
in the absence of a complete consideration of the entire system. Id. Similarly, the Royal Com-
mission on Criminal Procedure recognized that any change to an inquisitorial system would be
"impossible, on political and practical grounds." Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at T
1.8. Even the JUSTICE recommendations for the interrogation of suspects before a magistrate
specifically disclaimed that the judicial official would act as an examining magistrate. JUS-
TICE, The Interrogation of Suspects 1 14 (1967). In evidence submitted to the Royal Commis-
sion on Criminal Procedure, JUSTICE reaffirmed its position that a magisterial inquisition
along the lines of the Frenchjuge d'instruction was "not intended." JUSTICE, Pre-Trial Crimi-
nal Procedure 31 (1979). Nevertheless, others have conccluded that an effort should be made
to at least incorporate aspects of the inquisitorial system. Interview with Judge John Buzzard,
Central Criminal Court (November 18, 1981).
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JUSTICE, the British Section of the International Commission of Jurists,
has consistently recommended that the magisterial inquiry of the inquisito-
rial process be at least adapted to British criminal procedure. Under the
JUSTICE proposal, the police would still be in charge of the investigation of
the offense and the interrogation of the suspect, but a magistrate would be
available to validate any statement obtained from the accused or the fact
that the accused refused to make any statement. Although the proposal
would mean greater judicial involvement in the investigation process, the
recommendation did not contemplate the development of a magistrate's in-
quiry along the lines of the continental model.1
2 7
Under the JUSTICE proposals police would have retained the right to
question a suspect for an adequate length of time.' 28 Any statements made
to the police that were not subsequently confirmed before a magistrate, how-
ever, would not be admissible. t 29 The suspect would be informed of the
nature of police suspicions against him and that police questions would be
confined to the matter under suspicion. The individual would then be given
an opportunity to make a statement before questioning began and again
after it had concluded. He also would receive a caution which reflected the
fact that failure to answer legitimate questions could result in adverse infer-
ences or comment.130 The function of the judicial officer in the proceeding
would thus be "to ensure that the questioning by the police is done fairly,
that the suspect is given every opportunity of giving his explanations or ver-
127. JUSTICE, The Interrogation of Suspects 14 (1967); JUSTICE, Pre-Trial Criminal
Procedure 31 (1979).
128. JUSTICE, The Interrogation of Suspects § 1 (1967); JUSTICE, Pre-Trial Criminal
Procedure § 25(1) (1979).
129. JUSTICE, The Interrogation of Suspects §§ 2, 3 (1967); JUSTICE, Pre-Trial Criminal
Procedure § 25(3) (1979). The proposals of JUSTICE would also retain the admissibility of
statements made by individuals before becoming a suspect or being taken into custody, as well
as statements volunteered by a suspect on his first encounter with the police, such as the classic
exclamation, "it's a fair cop." JUSTICE, The Interrogation of Suspects § 18 (1967); JUSTICE,
Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure §§ 27, 28 (1979). In light of it's concern for excessive reliance on
volunteered statements, as well as the risk of distortion and misinterpretation, JUSTICE urged
greater availability of tape recorders to limit such problems. JUSTICE, Pre-Trial Criminal
Procedure § 28 (1979).
130. The magistrate would be required to tell the suspect
You have just heard from the police officer (or representative) why you have been
brought here, and in a few moments he is going to ask you some questions. Is there
anything you would like to say before he does so? There is no need to say anything at
the present stage unless you wish to do so because when the questioning is over you
will have another opportunity of saying anything you choose. Anything you do say
will of course be recorded and may be used as evidence later on if you are tried for the
offense which has (or, for any of the offenses which have) been mentioned.
After the suspect has either made or declined to make a statement the magistrate informs him:
You are going to be asked questions and it is your duty to answer them unless I say
that you need not do so. If you are brought to trial it may tell heavily against you if
you have refused to answer questions at this stage. On the other hand, the answers
which you give today may clear you of suspicion so that you will not be brought to
trial at all; and even if you are, it may then count in your favour if you do answer here
and now. I must also assure you that in answering these questions you have nothing to
fear from any threat which may have been made against you, and nothing to gain
from any promise which may have been made to you. Do you understand?
Finally, at the conclusion of the interrogation the magistrate informs the suspect:
Is there anything else that you would like to have on the record? You may say any-
thing more that you wish in explanation of the matters you have been asked about.
JUSTICE, The Interrogation of Suspects § 11 (1967).
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sion of the events, and that the proceedings are duly recorded and
certified."
13 1
In JUSTICE's view, the existence of a procedure for compulsory inter-
rogation before a magistrate would make it less important to provide imme-
diate access to a solicitor. 132 Nevertheless, their proposal provided for a
right of access to a solicitor for the general purpose of advice and consulta-
tion. In the context of the interrogation before a magistrate, however, the
solicitor's role would be sharply curtailed. He could object to the interroga-
tion in general as unjustified or raise objections to particular questions on
grounds of unfairness, irrelevance, or breach of privilege. He would also
have the right to pose his own questions to the suspect. Because the proposal
entailed the withdrawal of the right to refuse to answer questions based on
self-incrimination, and instead provided for sanctions of adverse inference
and comment should the suspect refuse to answer, JUSTICE concluded that
"it will become contrary to public policy and to professional etiquette for a
solicitor to encourage his client not to answer proper questions."'
33
JUSTICE viewed its system of compulsory examination before a magis-
trate as providing protection against unfair police interrogation while at the
same time ensuring the admissibility of any statements made by the accused
before the magistrate, and permitting appropriate adverse inferences and
comment in the event that the accused refused to respond. Nevertheless,
support for the JUSTICE proposals has not been forthcoming. The Crimi-
nal Law Revision Committee viewed the proposal to make any statement
given to the police prior to interrogation before a magistrate inadmissible as
contrary to its general philosophy favoring the admissibility of all relevant
evidence.' 34 Another concern was that the magisterial interrogation would
be too formal, leading suspects to refuse to answer and thus defeating the
purpose of the procedure. 135 This was a position reiterated by the Home
Office in its evidence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure.136 A
member of the Royal Commission added the concern that the suspect's
awareness of the inadmissibility of prior statements made to the police, and
of the necessity of reaffirmation of his admission before the magistrate, could
alert him to weaknesses in the state's evidence. As a result, police might well
apply additional pressure to secure reaffirmation of the suspect's state-
131. JUSTICE, Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure § 31 (1979).
132. JUSTICE, Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure § 46 (1979). Nevertheless, JUSTICE viewed
the right of access as "helpful and desirable" to permit the giving of advice concerning the
appearance before the referee, as well as providing an opportunity to answer questions concern-
ing such procedures as bail and pre-trial identifications. Id.
133. JUSTICE, The Interrogation of Suspects, § 15 (1967).
134. CLRC Report, supra note 4, at § 47. In explaining its general philosophy of relevance,
the Criminal Law Revision Committee observed that "[slince the object of a criminal trial
should be to find out if the accused is guilty, it follows that ideally all evidence should be
admissible which is relevant in the sense that it tends to render probable the existence or non-
existence of any fact on which the question of guilt or innocence depends." Id. at § 14.
135. The Committee thought that suspects might even be deterred from answering police
questions before commencement of the magistrate's questioning. See CLRC Report, supra note
4, at §§ 146-47.
136. Home Office Questioning Memorandum, supra note 23, 1 146-47.
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ment. 13 7 Resource limitations, were regularly cited by all opponents as a
major limitation.' 38 The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure's fun-
damental objection was one of principle. In its view any system of interroga-
tion before a magistrate reflected a break with the very nature of the
accusatorial system and risked shifting the burden of proof against the
accused. 139
The JUSTICE proposals for interrogation before a magistrate only
partly reflected an effort to alter the scope of the privilege against self-in-
crimination by providing for adverse inferences and comment in the event
the accused refused to respond. The same result could be achieved by sim-
ply permitting the same consequensces to follow from silence in the face of
police questioning. Beyond that objective, however, JUSTICE viewed its
proposals as a means of assuring fairness and accuracy in the interrogation
process. Although the JUSTICE scheme for achieving this end did not re-
ceive widespread support, its concern for fairness and accuracy has been re-
flected in a variety of different recommendations. Indeed, there has been
widespread agreement in the need for a system that would provide an accu-
rate record of the entire interrogation process, including any admissions
made by the suspect.
The emphasis upon the need for a system to ensure the accuracy of the
methods and output of the police interrogation process is a direct result of
British police reliance upon testimony as to oral admissions made by the
suspect. The issue has arisen so frequently and has become so controversial
that commentators have developed a special name for it-the so-called
verbals. The rules of evidence permit police to testify concerning a suspect's
verbal admission.140 When such testimony is presented, however, there are
two distinct risks. First, the ease of offering evidence of an oral statement
may provide an inducement to fabricate the admission, or falsely claim that
the admission was never made. Second, since the admission may be made in
the course of a conversation or as the result of a question and answer session,
the circumstances may not permit the police to make a contemporaneous
record of exactly what was said. Instead, the police may, several hours later,
attempt to write down their recollections of the admissions and in so doing
erroneously record the suspect's statements.
The risk of fabrication of verbals, as well as allegations that they have
been concocted, has been recognized for some time. The very nature of the
evidence is such that fabricating either the admission or an allegation that
the admission was never made is a simple undertaking. Lord Justice Lawton
commented that "something should be done and as quickly as possible, to
137. JUSTICE Conference on the Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure,
April 11, 1981 at 4 (remarks of Walter Merricks).
138. See supra notes 128-30. Se also Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at 4.59; Law
Society Evidence, supra note 102, at 16; Police Superintendant's Association of England and
Wales, Written Evidence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 5.22 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as Police Superintendant's Evidence].
139. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at 4.59.
140. The Judges' Rules state that voluntariness covers the admissibility of "any oral answer
given by that person to a question put by a police officer and of any statement made by that
person." Judges' Rules, supra note 28, Preamble § e.
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make evidence about oral statements difficult either to challenge or to con-
COCt."
' 141 Reliance upon such evidence has been subjected to increasing scru-
tiny by juries, to the point where some have felt that guilty defendants have
been able to secure acquittals solely on the basis of their challenges to police
veracity. At the same time, police cannot deny that instances of fabricated
verbals do exist.
14 2
English juries are also skeptical when police testify concerning verbal
admissions based upon notes they have made hours after the event, a skepti-
cism that is heightened when they deny collaborating with each other. One
judge observed that "police officers nearly always deny that they have col-
laborated in the making of notes, and we cannot help wondering why they
are the only class of society who do not collaborate in such a manner ...
Collaboration would appear to be a better explanation of almost identical
notes than the possession of a superhuman memory."' 143 There is a risk that
the more dogmatic an officer becomes about the accuracy of his recollection,
the greater the chance that the jury will disbelieve him entirely. 144 The un-
fairness of the system is only heightened by the fact that police generally do
not show their notes to the suspect, even though they may refer to them to
refresh their recollection at trial.
145
Most frequently urged as a solution to the problem of providing an ac-
curate record of interrogation sessions has been the proposal for requiring
that such sessions be tape recorded. The Criminal Law Revision Committee
recommended that the feasibility of such a requirement be studied, with a
minority of the Committee calling for the suspension of its proposals to per-
mit adverse inferences to be drawn from a suspect's silence until such a sys-
tem had been implemented. ' 46  The years since the Committee's
recommendation have produced no consensus on the wisdom and feasibility
of tape recording police interrogations. Police groups have been against the
proposal, arguing that it would be far too costly, would lessen the eviden-
tiary value of other unrecorded statements, would generate a new kind of
dispute as to the conditions preceding the point at which the tape recorder
was turned on, and have a further concern that the very presence of the tape
recorder would inhibit suspects from answering police inquiries. 14 7 Ques-
141. Turner, [1975] 61 Crim. App. 67, 77.
142. See Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, § 4.2; Senate of the Inns of Court and the
Bar, Submission to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 6 (1979); Williams, The Au-
thentication of Statements to the Police, 1979 CRIM. L. REV. 6, 14.
143. R. v. Bass, [19531 37 Crim. App. 51, 59. Lord Devlin saw this as a reaction to the
dilemma that if police evidence as to oral statements of the accused differed, counsel for the
defense could seize upon the inconsistencies, but that he would also take advantage of collabora-
tion to suggest to the jury that the statement was the product of the officers' agreed version. P.
DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND, 41 (1960). The state of the law has
changed, however, and it has been held that there was no error in admitting police oral testi-
mony where the officers had admitted collaborating in reconstructing the suspect's statements.
R. v. Quinlan and Turner, 1963 CRIM. L. REV. 349.
144. Senate of the Inns of Court and the Bar, Submission to the Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure 6 (1979).
145. Williams, The Authentication of Statements to the Police, 1979 CRIM. L. REV. 6, 11.
146. CLRC Report, supra note 4, at 51-52.
147. Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland, Evidence
to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 7.113(10) (1978); Commissioner of Police of
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tions have also been raised as to whether police simply fear criticism of their
interrogation techniques. 148 In contrast, others have supported the concept
of mandatory tape recording of police interrogations, arguing in favor of
both their feasibility and effectiveness. 14 9 Still other participants appear un-
able to come to a conclusion.150 No definitive steps towards the permanent
institution of such a plan have been taken. 1 5 ' The issue remains important
since written statements are given in only a minority of cases.1
52
The Royal Commission itself concluded that the tape recording of inter-
views at the police station is feasible and would not be excessively costly.
153
It did not, however, view the tape recording of entire interviews as either
practicable or desirable. 154 Instead, the Royal Commission recommended
that police conclude interviews by tape recording an oral summary of the
main points of the interrogation as well as preparing a written summary,
including any statements made outside of the police station. The suspect
should have his own opportunity to offer comments on both the interview
and summary. 155 In the Commission's view:
[this] will enable the gist of an interview or the taking of the writ-
ten statement to be got into the record without the need for tran-
scription. The officers written summary and the written statement
itself will, in effect, be the transcription of the major part of what is
on the tape.'
56
the Metropolis, Part One of the Written Evidence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Proce-
dure §§ 5.7(l)-(4) (1978); Police Superintendant's Association of England and Wales, Written
Evidence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 5.29 (1978).
148. Williams, The Authentication of Statements to the Poice, 1979 CRiM. L. REx', 6, 22.
149. Criminal Bar Association, Written Submission No. I to the Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure, § 16 (1978); JUSTICE, Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure, § 35-38 (1979); Law
Society, Memorandum on the Royal Commission's Report, § 5.14, at 24-26 (1981).
150. Prosecuting Solicitors' Society of England and Wales, Written Evidence to the Royal
Commission on Criminal Procedure 22 (1979) (supporting mechanical recording if cost effect
and reliable) [hereinafter cited as Prosecuting Solicitors' Evidence]. In considering the potential
benefits and costs of a system for monitoring police interrogations the Magistrate's Association
found itself "unable to propose any specific solution to this problem, which we are convinced
would work satisfactorily in practice within the framework of the accusatorial system." Magis-
trate's Association Memorandum to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure It (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Magistrate's Evidence].
151. Glanville Williams reported that successive Home Secretaries have accepted police ar-
guments against extensive tape recording, resulting in a "bi-partisan policy of defensive inactiv-
ity." Williams, The Authentliation of Statements to the Police, 1979 CRIM. L. REV. 6. Nevertheless,
experiments to determine the feasibility of a system of recording police interrogations continues,
with no insuperable technical problems arising, but with the participants desiring clarification
of the evidentiary implications of the taping system. The Times of London, March 17, 1982, p.
4, col. 4.
152. In research conducted for the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure Baldwin and
McConville found that only one in three suspects in a sample of cases prosecuted in Crown
Court in London had made a written statement, the figure being one in two for a comparable
sample in Birmingham. Baldwin and McConville, Confessions in Crown Court Trials, Royal
Commission on Criminal Procedure Research Study No. 5, at 13-14 (1980). An observational
study of police interrogation practices by Paul Softley of the Home Office Research Unit dis-
closed that only 28% of the sample made written statements during their period of detention by
the police. Softley, Police Interrogation: An Observational Study in Four Police Stations,
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure Research Study No. 4, at 81 (1980).
153. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, 4.25.
154. Id. at 4.26.
155. Id. at 4.27.
156. Id. at 4.29.
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The tape would be available for the defense lawyer in order to validate the
officer's written summary or written statement if there is a dispute as to ac-
curacy, and could conceivably be used at trial for the same purpose. The
Royal Commission rejected suggestions that evidence as to summaries or
written statements which have not been taped should be automatically
excluded. 157
In light of the available evidence, there is certainly a need for greater
accuracy in the process of recording a suspect's statements. One sample of
contested trials in Magistrates' Courts demonstrated that statements were
introduced in approximately one-third of the cases, with about one-half of
them being challenged. Nearly all the challenges to verbal statements were
based on their accuracy, while only a fraction of the written statements were
similarly challenged.
158
The Royal Commission also recognized the need to improve the accu-
racy of testimony about oral statements. Police practice has been to write
out the suspect's statement after the questioning ends, but not necessarily on
the basis of contemporaneously taken notes. The practical problems are that
interviews are sometimes conducted by one officer, thereby preventing un-
disturbed note taking, and some suspects are inhibited if notes are taken
while they are talking. Among the Royal Commission recommendations to
improve note taking were use of printed questionnaires wherever practica-
ble.' 5 9 Where this is not possible, the Royal Commission recommended that
the record presented to the court "should be presented . . . as what it is: a
minute of the salient relevant points made at the interview."' 16 If there has
not been a contemporaneous record of the statement or the suspect does not
elect to make a written statement under caution
it should become the practice for the interviewing officer at the end
of the interview and in the suspect's presence to note down in writ-
ing the main relevant points made during the interview. These
should be in summary form and should contain not only admis-
sions or damaging statements but also denials. The summary
might also include any remarks made to the police officer outside
the police station or before the caution. The summary should be
read over to the suspect, who should be invited to offer corrections
and additions to it if he wishes and also to sign it.
16 1
157. Id. at 4.28, 4.30.
158. Vennard, Contested Trials in Magistrate's Courts: the Case for the Prosecution, Royal
Commission on Criminal Procedure Research Study No. 6, at ch. 4 (1980). The problem is
hardly new. Lord Devlin referred to it in his published version of the Sherrill Lecture he deliv-
ered in 1956 at the Yale Law School. P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND
48 (1960). He observed, however, that "the general reputation of the police is good enough for
their version of oral statements to carry great weight, so long as the jury is given no reasons to
suspect any unfairness or lack of impartiality in the particular circumstances." Id. However, it
is no longer clear that juries can be depended upon to accept police versions of oral statements,
and there are definite signs of growing distrust between police and various segments of British
society, as evidenced by the disorders during 1981 and the conclusions of the Government in-
quiry into the disturbances undertaken by Lord Scarman. See generally Times of London, No-
vember 26, 1981, p. 1, col. 2; p. 4, col. 1; p. 5 col. 4.
159. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at 4.12.
160. Id. at 4.13.
161. Id. In a related development, the Metropolitan Police have adopted a policy of where
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Others present might also be invited to sign. Even though the Royal Com-
mission recognized that a suspect who did not wish to sign a written state-
ment might not sign the summary, it nevertheless believed its
recommendations were an improvement over existing practice. The recom-
mendations would eliminate the problem that the suspect neither signed the
officer's record made after the interview nor knew until much later what was
in it, while later being faced with a claim that it represented a verbatim
account of what the suspect said.
The police themselves are well aware of the fact that the existing system
of testifying as to oral statements made by suspects has had an adverse effect
on prosecutions. There is concern that juries are reluctant to credit police
officer testimony as to verbals. 162 Although the Metropolitan Police re-
sponded with a system of using, where feasible, two officers during question-
ing, with one writing down the questions and answers, and with the suspect
being asked to initial it at the completion, it was felt that even this could
inhibit securing necessary admissions. 163 This practice is similar to recom-
mendations of the Criminal Bar Association and JUSTICE164 calling for a
procedure in which the suspect is provided with immediate indications of the
record being made of his responses and is given an opportunity to verify
them.
There was less agreement as to the merit of the Royal Commission's
recommendation that police tape record summaries of the interview with the
suspect. One commentator noted:
There is a distinct danger that if used at trial the prejudicial effect
of such tape-recordings might greatly exceed their evidential value.
The fact that a confession or the accused's assent to a summary is
recorded on tape does not necessarily constitute supporting evi-
dence of reliability, although an undiscriminating jury might all
too readily regard it as having that effect. Moreover, factual dis-
putes concerning events preceding confession would not be re-
solved by recordings of this nature.
165
The Law Society expressed grave reservations as to the acceptability of a
summary of the suspect's statement as a substitute for a full tape record-
feasible using two officers to conduct an interrogation, one writing down the questions and
answers, and then at the conclusion offering the suspect an opportunity to initial the result.
Morton, The Royal Commssion on Criminal Procedure: A Solicitor's View, 131 NEw L.J., 276, 277
(1981). It is not clear, however, how frequently it is feasible to commit two officers to the
interrogation process. Interview with Michael Wilmot, Solicitor's Branch Metropolitan Police
(October 20, 1982).
162. Interview with Michael Wilmot, Solicitor's Branch Metropolitan Police (October 20,
1982); interview with Richard DuCann, Q.C. (November 11, 1981).
163. Morton, supra note 161, at 277-78, Interview with Michael Wilmot, Solicitor's Branch,
Metropolitan Police (October 20, 1981).
164. Criminal Bar Association, Written Submission No. I to the Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure, part 2, § 14 (1978) (suspect should be invited to sign entries of his oral
statements and be given a copy, both being handled by an officer not involved in the investiga-
tion); JUSTICE, Comment on the Home Office Consultative Memorandum 6 (1981) (contem-
poraneous notation of suspect statements to be countersigned by suspect in presence of station
officers, with copies immediately supplied to suspect or his solicitor). See also Prosecuting Solici-
tors' Evidence, supra note 143, at 24 (1979) (admissibility conditioned on prompt written nota-
tion of statement with opportunity given to the suspect to sign it).
165. Inman, The Admzssibih'ty of Confessions, 1981 CRIM. L. REv. 469, 480.
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ing.166 It suggested that three specific difficulties would arise from the sys-
tem of tape recording summaries.
First, it gives the interviewing officer an opportunity of selecting
from the interview the points, which he, whether consciously or
sub-consciously, wishes to emphasize, and therefore becomes an
even less accurate record of the interview than the notes made by
the interviewing officer. Secondly, it provides no safeguard to the
suspect or police against the use of or allegation of antecedent op-
pression. Thirdly, there is the danger that a jury may give greater
credence to such a summary than it does to other evidence.
1 67
At most, the Law Society was willing to accept a tape recording of a sum-
mary of the interview, "with suitable safeguards," as a temporary measure
pending the introduction of the regular tape recording. It was felt, however,
that this should encompass allowing the suspect to comment on each of the
main points of the summary as they were made.68 Overall, the amount of
the attention given to the accuracy problem demonstrates that it remains a
persistent and serious concern within the English criminal justice system.
D. Access to a Solicitor
The right to have access to and consult with an attorney has become an
especially important device in controlling the police interrogation process in
the United States. Not only do the Miranda warnings include notification of
the right to counsel,1 69 but also failure to respect the assertion of that right
will render any subsequent confession automatically inadmissible. 1 70 Argua-
bly, once an attorney undertakes to represent an accused, counsel is in a
position to protect him from an unwise decision to provide the authorities
with incriminating evidence.1 7 1 The scope of the right to counsel in the reg-
ulation of police interrogations clearly suggests an effort to develop a broad
protective shield against abuse. Counsel is present as an advisor to and pro-
tector of the accused, not merely as a witness to the event.
In Great Britain, both the Judges' Rules and the accompanying Admin-
istrative Directions make provisions for the right of access to a solicitor. Pur-
suant to the Preamble to the Rules,
every person at any stage of an investigation should be able to com-
municate and to consult privately with a solicitor. This is so even if
he is in custody, provided that in such a case no unreasonable hin-
derance is caused to the processes of investigation or the adminis-
166. Law Society, Observations on the Consultative Memorandum from the Home Office
6-7 (1981).
167. Law Society, Memorandum on the Royal Commission's Report 25 (1981).
168. Id. at 26.
169. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-75 (1966).
170. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
171. E.g., the New York courts require that police refrain from questioning a suspect who is
represented by counsel unless they obtain an affirmative waiver in the attorney's presence. Peo-
ple v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 348 N.E.2d'894 (1976). This is comparable to
the position of the National Council for Civil Liberties prohibiting a waiver of the right of




tration of justice by his doing so.17 2
This is supplemented by Administrative Direction 7(a)(i) which permits him
to speak on the telephone with his solicitor "provided that no hinderance is
reasonably likely to be caused to the processes of investigation or the admin-
istration of justice."'
73
Despite these affirmative rights, the required caution to the suspect
makes no mention of the fact that he may consult with his solicitor. Even
though Administrative Direction 7(b) calls for the suspect being orally in-
formed of the rights and facilities available to him, supplemented by con-
spicuously placed notices,' 74 this has proven ineffective. The Court of
Appeal held in R. V. King 175 that there is no error in the failure of the police
to inform the suspect of his right to a solicitor. In the court's view the para-
graph of the Adminstrative Direction containing the right of access includes
no warning requirement, while the paragraph calling for notification of
rights made no mention that the notice had to be given at any particular
time, thus allowing the suspect to be informed of his right of access to coun-
sel following the conclusion of questioning. Suspects who have, however,
been arrested and are being held in custody do have the statutory protection
of the Criminal Law Act of 1977 which provides custodial arrestees with the
right
to have intimation of his arrest and of the place where he is being
held sent to one person reasonably named by him, without delay
or, where some delay is necessary in the interest of the investigation
or prevention of crime or the apprehension of offenders, with no
more delay than is so necessary.1
76
Yet, even though intimation of the arrest and custody may be given to a
solicitor, 1 77 this falls far short of a right to consultation.
There is a strong prevailing feeling that what appears to be a "right" to
have access to a solicitor is, in fact, ignored in practice. The available re-
search in England indicates that very few defendants ask for the assistance of
a solicitor, and such requests as are made are frequently denied. 178 More-
over, the evidence submitted to the Royal Commission on Criminal Proce-
dure voiced virtually unanimous agreement that police repeatedly deny
suspect requests for access to a solicitor, as well as independent efforts by
solicitors to consult with individuals they have been retained to represent. 1
79
172. Judges' Rules, supra note 28, preamble § (c).
173. Id., Administrative Direction 7(a)(i).
174. Id., Administrative Direction 7(b).
175. R. v. King, 1980 CRIM. L. REv. 40.
176. Criminal Law Act 1977, c. 45, s. 62.
177. See Home Office Circular No. 74/1978 to Chief Officers of Police Concerning Section
62 of the Criminal Law Act 1977, 28 April 1978 at § 5, reprintedin Royal Commission Procedure
Study, supra note 44, at app. 14.
178. Sofiley reported that only 11% of his sample of 168 adult suspects requested to confer
with a solicitor, and of those nearly V3 were denied. Softley, Police Interrogation: An Observa-
tional Study in Four Police Stations, Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure Research Study
No. 4, at 68 (1980). Comparable conclusions were reached in Baldwin and McConvill, Police
Interrogation and the Right to See a Solicitor 1979 CRIM. L. REv. 145 and Zander, Access to a Solicitor
in the Police Station 1972 CRIM. L. REV. 342.
179. Eg., Criminal Bar Association, Written Submission No. I to the Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure, part 2, § 18 (1978); Law Society Evidence, supra note 108, at 17; London
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This situation prompted one Court of Appeal decision to remind police that
"it is not a good reason for refusing to allow a suspect, under arrest or deten-
tion, to see his solicitor, that he has not yet made any oral or written admis-
sion."' 80 Additionally, in a more dramatic step, a confession obtained by
police after denying access to a solicitor was excluded by a Crown Court
judge out of concern that officers would otherwise ignore the right of access
to a solicitor.18 1 This lead has not been followed, and elsewhere confessions
obtained under similar circumstances have been admitted.
18 2
Despite the apparent consensus that the right of access to a solicitor is
frequently denied on pretextual grounds, the Metropolitan Police evidence
to the Royal Commission was nevertheless content to make no changes in
existing practice. t8 3 Yet, the view that the right of access to counsel cannot
be unqualified was shared by other groups presenting evidence to the Royal
Commission on Criminal Procedure. Often their comments simply reflected
the position that police should retain the authority to deny access to a solici-
tor because of the potential risks to people and property if critical informa-
tion was leaked. 184 Those supporting qualifications on the right of access to
a solicitor, however, were unable to articulate a precise definition of appro-
priate situations where access could be denied. The Criminal Bar Associa-
tion failed to even address this issue, concentrating instead on procedural
requirements that if access is to be denied, the suspect must be so informed
in the presence of an officer independent of the investigation, and with due
record made.' 8 5 The proposal of the Prosecuting Solicitors' Society, that
private consultation with a solicitor be permitted "unless there are reason-
able grounds for believing that the process of justice would be impeded,"'
' 8 6
hardly constitutes a detailed criterium. Although it is appropriate to call for
greater judicial vigilance in the supervision of police interrogations, as was
recommended by the Criminal Bar Association,' 8 7 enforcement will of ne-
cessity be inconsistent absent reasonably specific criteria.
Along with suggestions that the existing system be retained have come
recommendations for greater protection of the right of access to a solicitor.
At one extreme, the right of access could be made a mandated procedure,
with all statements obtained in violation of the right being excluded.' 8 8
Criminal Courts Solicitor's Association, Evidence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Proce-
dure § g, at 6 (1979); Police Superintendant's Association of England and Wales, Written Evi-
dence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, § 7.17 (1978).
180. R. v. Lemsatef [1977] All E.R. 835, 840.
181. R. v. Allen, 1977 CRIM. L. REV. 163.
182. R. v. Elliot, 1977 CRIM. L. REV. 551; R. v. Dodd, Justice of the Peace, October 31,
1981, vol. 145, at 649.
183. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Written Evidence to the Royal Commission
on Criminal Procedure, part 1 at $ 4.26 (1978).
184. Police Superintendant's Evidence, supra note 137, at § 7.5. This position was implicit
in the Magistrate's Association view that the existing Judges' Rules and Administrative Direc-
tions are satisfactory. Magistrate's Evidence, supra note 150, at 12.
185. Criminal Bar Evidence, supra note 113, at § 18.
186. Prosecuting Solicitor's Evidence, supra note 150, 7(6), at 32-33.
187. Criminal Bar Evidence, supra note 113, at 19.
188. Legal Action Group, Legality in the Criminal Process: Evidence to the Royal Commis-
sion on Criminal Procedure 3.23(2), (3) (1979). The Prosecuting Solicitors' Society recom-
mended that admissions made other than in the presence of a solicitor would be admissible only
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Even greater protection could be provided if the right of access was made
non-waivable as recommended by the National Council for Civil Liber-
ties.' 8 9 Other calls for improved protection of the right of access to counsel,
however, were premised upon recommendations for drastic reform of the
right of silence. Those who called for the use of adverse inferences against
suspects who remain silent in police interrogation, and changes in the cau-
tion to inform the suspect of that fact, were willing to allow the suspect to
consult with his solicitor free of intrusion. Most took the position, however,
that the solicitor could not advise his client to remain silent and that any
such advice would not constitute a reasonable explanation for the suspect's
silence so as to mitigate the effect of the adverse inference.190 Under these
conditions, there would hardly be any reason to discourage access to a solici-
tor since such consultation would be likely to increase the chances of the
suspect responding to the interrogation.
Ultimately, the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure rejected sug-
gestions that it fundamentally restructure the right to silence. Thus, any call
for improved protections for the right of access to a solicitor could not be
coupled with restrictions upon the scope of advice the solicitor could offer.
Similarly, the Commission rejected use of a solicitor as a witness to the
events of the interrogation, just as it rejected the call for questioning before a
magistrate.' 9 1 The Royal Commission did view the right of access to a solic-
itor as protecting important interests of the accused, and thus constituting a
right in need of protection. As a result, it recomended that the accused be
informed of his right to a solicitor but also be permitted to waive that
right. 192 In contrast, the solicitor would have no independent right to con-
sult with his client, because the Royal Commission viewed the right of access
as a right vested in the accused. 193 If the right is invoked, the solicitor should
be allowed to be present during the police interview, but his function would
only be to offer the suspect advice if it is requested.' 94 Although the Royal
Commission recognized the importance of access to a solicitor and the strong
arguments in favor of making it mandatory, it was persuaded that it should
permit discretion to withhold access "where exercise of it would cause unrea-
sonable delay or hinderance to the processes of investigation or the adminis-
tration of justice."'1 95 This exception was not meant to include withholding
access because the solicitor might advise his client not to speak, nor where
if it was impossible to secure the attendance of the solicitor, the statement was volunteered
before the defendant was advised of his rights or before the solicitor could attend, or the defend-
ant refused a solicitor. Prosecuting Solicitors' Evidence, supra note 150, § 7(4). at 30-31.
189. Inner Temple Conference, supra note 62 (remarks of Harriet Harmon, Counsel, Na-
tional Council for Civil Liberties).
190. E.g., Chief Police Officers Evidence, supra note 107, at 7.46; Prosecuting Solicitors'
Evidence, supra note 150, at 7(6), at 32; Interview with Judge John Buzzard, Central Criminal
Court, London, (November 18, 1981).
191. Royal Commission Report,supra note 4, at 4.60, 4.99. In the Commission's view the
use of magistrates or solicitors to validate an interview would create serious resource problems
and would involve both in performing functions inconsistent with their traditional role.
192. Id. at 4.87. The waiver would not have to be in the presence of a solicitor.
193. Id. at 4.88.
194. Id. at 4.87-4.88.
195. Id. at 4.89.
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secrecy is desirable but not imperative. 196
To insure proper control the Royal Commission recommended that re-
fusal of access to a solicitor should be limited to grave offenses. 19 7 Addition-
ally, there should be:
reasonable grounds to believe that the time taken to arrange for
legal advice to be available will involve a risk of harm to persons or
serious damage to property; or that giving access to a legal advisor
may lead to one or more of the following:
a) evidence of the offense or offenses under investigation will be
interfered with;
b) witnesses to those offenses will be harmed or threatened;
c) other persons suspected of committing those offenses will be
alerted; or
d) the recovery of the proceeds of. those offenses will be
impeded. 198
The decision to deny access would have to be made by a ranking officer,
appropriately recorded, and subject to later review. 199 Yet despite the detail
of the recommendations, the Royal Commission was unwilling to recom-
mend exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of its proposals. Its view
was that despite the lack of legal advice, resulting statements might well be
sufficiently reliable to justify their admission.
2 00
The Law Society and Bar Council initially expressed agreement with
the Royal Commission recommendations, noting that the resource problem
of providing solicitors could be met and cautioning that the exceptions to the
right of access would have to be narrowly drawn.20 1 In a more extended
analysis, the Law Society questioned the exclusion of grave offenses from the
automatic right of access, labelling it illogical.2 0 2 In response to the Home
Office Consultative Memorandum seeking clarification of views on the im-
pact of the Royal Commision recommendation, 20 3 the Law Society indi-
cated that it "reluctantly supported" the Royal Commission's proposals.
2 0 4
It recognized no other acceptable solution to balancing the need for legal
advice, which is not qualified in cases of grave offenses, with the risk to prop-
196. Id. at 4.90.
197. Id. at 4.91. The term grave offenses is defined in 3.7 of the Commission's Report to
include serious offenses against the person, property, dishonesty, and other drug and administra-
tion of justice crimes.
198. Id. at 4.91.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 4.92.
201. Law Society and Bar Counsel Memorandum, supra note 121, 11, at p. 4. The memo-
randum did, however, admit that resources were inadequate to provide solicitors if there was a
mandatory requirement of their presence at all interviews.
202. Law Society Memorandum, supra note 121, § 5.15, at p. 27. Additionally, the Law
Society observed that in order to fulfill the Commission's proposal to provide mandatory access
to counsel in lesser offenses, it would be necessary to eliminate the restrictions on access to
counsel for such offenses contained in section 7(a) of the Administrative Directions accompany-
ing the Judges' Rules and in section 62 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 providing for the suspect
to give intimation of his arrest to another person.
203. Home Office, A Consultative Memorandum on the Report of the Royal Commission
on Criminal Procedure 12 (1981).
204. Law Society, Observations on the Consultative Memorandum from the Home Office,
12 at 7 (1981).
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erty, persons, and the processes ofjustice that prompt access might generate.
The Royal Commission proposals were seen as a clear improvement over the
practice of allowing junior officers to regularly deny counsel in all classes of
cases simply because of fear that access would reduce the likelihood that
suspects would respond. Additionally, the Law Society saw it as appropriate
to warn the jury of reliability considerations in the event that the prosecu-
tion seeks to use a statement obtained in violation of the suspect's right of
access to counsel. 20 5 In response to the Home Office inquiry as to whether
there were any steps that could be taken to guard against the risk of disclo-
sure so that the right of access could be made absolute, the Law Society
concluded that no practicable means exist to prevent solicitors from causing
mischief. They added, however, "it is acknowledged that the police view of
impropriety may differ from the profession's view and consideration may
have to be given, by the profession, to giving further appropriate guidance to
its members."
20 6
The English take a different view of the right to counsel in criminal
matters, particularly during investigative procedures. This is amply demon-
strated by the general acceptance by many influential groups of conditions
justifying denial of access to counsel. Even efforts at tightening the criteria
that would justify denial of counsel to the accused still left ample discretion
for police to use their own judgment. There was frequent objection to the
propriety of denying access because of fear that counsel would advise silence,
but there was also significant support for reforming the right to silence so as
to render such advice improper. This would leave counsel with a very lim-
ited role in interrogations and obviate the risk that his presence would im-
pede the interrogations.
III. THE RIGHT TO SILENCE IN THE COURTROOM
Under the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898, a defendant in an English
criminal trial has the right not to give evidence or appear as a witness.20 7 In
a sense, the right not to give evidence is broader than the scope of the gen-
eral right to silence. In any other context, the right to silence would author-
ize the individual to refuse to answer self-incriminatory questions.20 8 Yet,
British law, as is true in the United States, 20 9 permits the accused to refuse to
give evidence at all. In the United States this has been partly explained by
concern that forcing the accused to give evidence would expose his character
to the jury which in turn might be more damaging than anything the ac-
cused might say. The U.S. Supreme Court expressed this view when it ob-
served that "[e]xcessive timidity, nervousness when facing others and
attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious character, and offenses
charged against him, will often confuse and embarrass him to such a degree
205. Id. at 8.
206. Id. at 9.
207. Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., ch. 36, § l(a).
208. R. v. Boyes, I B. & S. 311, 1861-1873 All E.R. 172 (1861); R. v. Coote, [18731 L.R. 4
P.C. 599; Rio Tinto Zinc v. Westinghouse, [1978] 1 All E.R. 434.
209. BERGER, supra note 7, at 73-80.
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as to increase rather than remove prejudices against him."'210 These facets of
the accused's personality would also be exposed in English trials if he was
forced to give evidence, but the total impact would be lessened as a result of
more restrictive rules governing the cross-examination of the defendant as to
prior crimes.
2 11
As part of the series of compromises leading to the Criminal Evidence
Act of 1898, the accused was made a competent witness in his own behalf,
thus reversing the rule by which he had up until then been disqualified from
testifying in his own trial, but he could not be compelled to give evidence
over his objection. 2 12 Additionally, the prosecution was explicitly prohibited
from commenting upon the accused's failure to give evidence. 2 13 Moreover,
where the accused chose to give evidence, cross-examination as to his charac-
ter and prior convictions was expressly limited to situations enumerated in
the statute.21 4 It was later held that by necessary implication, where an ac-
cused chooses to give evidence he may no longer claim the privilege against
self-incrimination with respect to questions whose answers might result in
the defendant incriminating himself.
2 15
The absence of any specific prohibition against judicial comment on the
accused's failure to give evidence, particularly in light of the specific prohibi-
tion barring prosecutorial comment, has been held sufficient authority to
permit the trial judge to refer to the accused's silence during trial when sum-
ming up for the jury.2 16 However, this has not prevented confusion from
arising as to the permissible scope of such judicial comment. Where the trial
judge lets himself get carried away in his comments to the jury on the ac-
cused's silence, appellate courts have been willing to reverse. Thus, in a 1950
decision, the Privy Council held improper a judge's comment that the de-
fendant "has not seen fit to go there in the witness box. . . . You have not
been able to ask him one question; the one person who is alive today to tell
210. Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893).
211. See infra note 232.
212. As a result of the Evidence Act of 1851 parties in civil cases had become competent
witnesses. Evidence Act 1851, § 2, 14 & 15 Victoria, ch. 99. In piecemeal fashion, as Parliament
created new offenses, it added provisos allowing the accused in any charge under the new act to
be a competent witness, but at the same time it avoided any general reform allowing all defend-
ants to testify. BERGER, supra note 5, at 46. It was estimated that by 1898 some 20% to 25% of
all accused persons were competent to testify by virtue of such enactments. Home Office Evi-
dence Memorandum, supra note 16, 57. Nevertheless, concern remained that making wit-
nesses competent to testify would unfairly compel them to give evidence to their own
disadvantage which in turn might potentially lead to the conviction of innocent individuals. As
a compromise measure, the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898 provided that although the accused
was competent to be a witness in his own behalf, he could not be compelled to give evidence.
One observer has expressed doubt whether there was much support for making the defendant a
compellable witness, and thus it is unclear whether the act was a compromise measure or simply
reflected the prevailing beliefs of the time. Compare Home Office Evidence Memorandum, supra
note 16, at 58 wizh Cross, supra note 5, at 411.
213. Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict. ch. 36, § 1(b). The act contains no ban on
comment by the judge, and subsequent case law has held such to be permissible within limits.
R. v. Rhodes [1899] 1 Q.B. 77.
214. Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict. ch. 36, § I(f).
215. "A defendant who gives evidence is, unlike any other witness, bound to answer ques-
tions even though the answers may incriminate himself." Minihane, [1921] 16 Crim. App. 38.
216. R. v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 77. Judicial comment on the silence of the accused was
deemed to be a matter of trial court discretion.
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us what happened. '2 17 In a more recent 1973 decision by the Court of Ap-
peal the trial judge was held to have committed error in saying to the jury
but you may think members of the jury, that in a case of this kind
it was really almost essential, if there was a real explanation as to
his part, . . .is it not essential that he should go into the witness
box himself and tell you that himself and be subject to cross-exami-
nation about it. Well, he did not do so and there it is.
2 18
Yet, a judge's observation to the jury that it "might have found it more
satisfactory and of a greater assistance to you if she had gone into the witness
box" 2 19 was held not to be in error. Sir Rupert Cross' conclusion from the
existing case law is that
[a~ll that can be said on the authority is that the question whether
the judge should make any comment, and how far he should go in
commenting, depend on the particular facts, and that it is essential
for the judge to make two things plain to the jury, first, that the
accused has the right not to testify, second, that they must not as-
sume that he is guilty because he does not do so.
22 0
More generally, the area appears to be one in which British commentators
are reluctant to commit themselves to a statement of what the law purport-
edly is. The uncertainty may lead judges either to make no comment what-
soever, or to remark solely upon the right of the accused not to give evidence
without suggesting any adverse inferences from such silence, however
limited.
22 1
In tracing the history of the Criminal Evidence Act, the Criminal Law
Revision Committee noted that the suggestion had been made during the
consideration of the bill for a prohibition against comment by both the pros-
ecutor and judge. This was initially resisted by the then Solicitor-General,
but he eventually agreed to a compromise in which only comment by the
prosecution would be barred. He thought the judge should retain the discre-
tion to comment in appropriate cases such as where the defense attacked the
character of the prosecutor.2 22 In the Committee's view, the trial judge
under current law has more power to suggest adverse inferences than is nor-
mally exercised as long as he does not comment that the jury should draw an
217. Waugh v. The King, 1950 A.C. 203, 210-211.
218. R. v. Sparrow, [1973] 1 W.L.R. 488, 492. Improper comments were also found to have
been made in R. v. Mutch, [1973] 1 All E.R. 178, 179 ("the jury are entitled to draw inferences
unfavorable to the prisoner where he is not called to establish an innocent explanation of facts
proved by the prosecution which, without such an explanation, tell for his guilt").
219. Story, [19681 52 Crim. App. 334.
220. Cross, supra note 5, at 414. Another commentator has suggested that the judge's com-
ment may not suggest that silence constitutes corroboration or proof of guilt. C. HAMPTON,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 197 (1977). Additionally, there is a suggestion in R. v. Bathurst, [1968]
2 Q.B. 99, that there may be a wider scope for judicial comment on the accused's failure to give
evidence with respect to affirmative defenses.
221. Thus, it was reported in a recent newspaper account on the trial of three prison officers
accused of murder that the judge made the following comment on the failure of the defendants
to give evidence. "It is their right not to give evidence; it is their entitlement and right to make
an unsworn statement from the dock. It would be quite wrong to draw any adverse inference
towards any of the accused from their failure to give evidence on oath." Times of London,
March 18, 1982, p. 3, col. 6.
222. CLRC Report, supra note 4, at 108.
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inference ofguiI from the accused's failure to give evidence. 223 The Com-
mittee's conclusion, however, was that "the present law and practice are
much too favourable to the defence."
'224
As an alternative, the Committee recommended that once a prima facie
case against the accused was established, "it should be regarded as incum-
bent on him to give evidence in all ordinary cases."' 225 Failure to do so, in
the Committee's view, would call for adverse comment by both the judge
and prosecutor. 226 In support of its position the Committee argued that if
adverse comment is warranted, there is no basis for barring the prosecution
from making it given the fact that limiting adverse comment to the judge
might make the latter seem like an extra prosecutor. Additionally, since the
defense addresses the jury after the prosecution, it will have the ability to
reply to any comment the prosecutor might make.
22 7
The Committee was also willing to authorize broader comments than
current law permits the judge to make. It recommended that any adverse
inference dictated by common sense should be permitted, a standard similar
to the one the Committee proposed for an accused's failure to mention dur-
ing pre-trial interrogation any fact on which he intended to rely at trial.22 8
The Committee added its recommendation that such inferences should be
considered as corroboration where required by law.
229
The Committee recognized that its recommendations would greatly in-
crease the pressure on the accused to testify, but its proposals did not end
there. It added a recommendation that following the presentation of an ade-
quate prima facie case
the court should tell the accused that he will be called on at the
appropriate time to give evidence in his own defence and should
tell him what the effect will be if he refuses to do so; and we pro-
pose that, when this time comes, the court should formally call on
the accused to give evidence.
230
The purpose of calling on the accused to give evidence, in the Committee's
view, was to demonstrate to the jury or magistrate "that the accused had the
right, an obligation, to give evidence but declined to do so. ' '231
Under American criminal procedure a proposal comparable to that of
the Criminal Law Revision Committee would have a devastating impact. It
would force the accused to either suffer the consequences of substantial ad-
verse inferences being called to the jury's attention or subjecting the defend-
ant's entire criminal record to the jury's consideration as a result of cross-
examination to impeach the defendant's credibility. 23 2 English law is far
more protective of the accused who gives evidence. Under the Criminal Evi-
223. Id. at 1109.




228. Id. See supra note 101.
229. CLRC Report, supra note 4, at 111.
230. Id. at 112.
231. Id.
232. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 609. The judge, however, may disallow the impeachment by
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dence Act, when the accused is called as a witness he may not be questioned
about any prior convictions unless they are either relevant to show that he
committed the current offense; the witness has given evidence against a co-
defendant; the accused has given evidence or asked questions of the prosecu-
tion to establish his own good character; or, finally, his defense has been such
as to "involve imputations on the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses
for the prosecution. "
23 3
The Criminal Evidence Act does permit the prosecutor to prove the
defendant's prior offenses where they are relevant to establishing his guilt for
the offense with which he is charged. Indeed, if such evidence is admissible,
it could be produced on the prosecutor's presentation of his case-in-chief
without having to rely on cross-examination. 23 4 The more substantial pro-
tections are those which control the use of cross-examination as to prior con-
victions for purposes of impeaching the credibility of the accused. Under
American law such cross-examination is uniformly authorized, thus forcing a
difficult choice upon the defendant. If he has a significant criminal record
he can only testify at the risk of revealing the record to the jury, and with the
hope that it will not be misused by the jury to infer guilt nor unduly affect
his credibility. The British defendant, in contrast, may testify and avoid
revealing his prior criminal record by not placing his character in issue, not
making any imputation on the character of the prosecutor or his witnesses,
and refraining from giving evidence against a co-defendant.
There is some uncertainty as to the scope of the cross-examination
shield created by the Criminal Evidence Act. Lord Devlin took the position
that the defendant puts his character in issue, and subjects himself to cross-
examination by prior convictions, when he produces testimony as to a good
reputation. 23 5 Professor Cross argued that the existing case law, as well as
statutory construction, demonstrate that character is put in issue when the
defendant produces testimony as to his disposition, as distinct from the repu-
tation others have of him.
23 6
More substantial difficulties appear to have arisen from the exception
which permits cross-examination of the defendant where he has cast imputa-
tions on the character of the prosecutor or his witnesses. Cases in which the
defendant claims that the police have fabricated a confession 23 7 or has de-
scribed police testimony as "wishful thinking"238 have been held sufficient to
justify cross-examination as to the defendant's prior convictions. There is,
however, a risk that a literal construction of the statute would permit cross-
examination of the accused even where he did no more than merely deny his
proof of a prior conviction if its probative value is outweighed by the prejudicial impact. See
also MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 84-90 (2d ed. 1972).
233. Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 61 & 62 Vict., ch. 36 § 1(0(ii). However, impeachment
by prior convictions is discretionary. See R. PATrENDEN, THE JUDGE, DISCRETION AND THE
CRIMINAL TRIAL 79 (1982).
234. See Cross, supra note 5, at 423-24.
235. Jones v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1962] 1 All E.R. 569.
236. Cross, supra note 5, at 426-27.
237. Levy, (1966] 50 Crim. App. 238.
238. Tanner, [1977] 66 Crim. App. 56.
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guilt.239 The mere assertion of innocence might be viewed as a suggestion
that the prosecutor's witnesses were lying. The solution to this dilemma has
been the interpretation of the Criminal Evidence Act to permit cross-exami-
nation where the defendant cast imputations on the character of the wit-
nesses for the prosecution to show their unreliability as witnesses
independently of the evidence given by them, or when the casting of the
imputations is necessary to enable the accused to establish his defense.
240
Such cross-examination is barred when the defendant simply denied making
a confession without alleging that the police fabricated it. 2 4 ' Simply deny-
ing the charge, even if emphatically, will not cause the defendant to lose his
shield. 242 Even where testimony as to prior offenses may be given, this may
not include going beyond the fact of conviction to show a pattern of
offenses.
24 3
In situations where the defendant seeks to cast imputations on the char-
acter of the prosecutor or his witnesses, he can avoid revealing his past con-
victions by making an unsworn statement from the dock. 244 The procedure
of allowing the defendant to make an unsworn statement from the dock, free
of the risk of cross-examination, grew out of the history leading to the pas-
sage of the 1898 Criminal Evidence Act. Prior to that time the accused was
not permitted to give evidence and was not entitled to full representation by
counsel. The unsworn statement was a means to allow him to prcscnt his
case. The practice survived the Criminal Evidence Act as a way of allowing
the defendant to avoid cross-examination. The evidentiary status of such
statements remains unclear. One court of appeal decision suggested that
[w]hat is said in such a statement is not to be altogether brushed
aside but its potential affect is persuasive rather than evidential. It
cannot prove facts not otherwise proved by the evidence before the
jury, but it may make the jury see the proven facts and inferences
to be drawn from them in a different light.
245
Even though a jury may not be directed to disregard the statement, "it can
be properly pointed out to them that it can not have the same value as sworn
evidence which has been tested by cross-examination.
246
There has been a great deal of opposition to the procedure of allowing
the accused to make an unsworn statement from the dock, including calls for
its abolition by the Criminal Law Revision Committee24 7 and the Royal
239. See Cohen, Challenging Police Evidence of Interviews and the Second Limb of§ I(f)(ii)-An-
other View, 1981 CRIM. L. REV. 523; Cross, supra note 5, at 429-30.
240. Selvey v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions [1970] A.C. 304.
241. Nelson, [19791 68 Grim. App. 12.
242. R. v. Rouse, [19041 1 K.B. 184. This principle has been extended to cases in which the
defendant alleges that the victim of a claimed rape in fact consented to intercourse. Rather
than viewing such a defense as an imputation on the prosecution witness, it is taken instead as a
simple denial of guilt. See Cross, supra note 5, at 432.
243. R. v. France and France, 1979 CRIM. L. REV. 48.
244. See R. v. Butterwasser, [19481 I K.B. 4; Cohen, The Unswom Statement From the Dock,
1981 CRIM. L. REV. 224.
245. R. v. Coughlan, [1976] 64 Grim. App. 11, 17.
246. Campbell, [1978] 69 Crim. App. 221 (C.A.).
247. CLRC Report, supra note 4, at 104.
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Commission on Criminal Procedure. 248 Support for removing the shield
protecting the accused against cross-examination on his prior convictions,
however, has not materialized. Only a minority of the members of the Crim-
inal Law Revision Committee thought that the accused should receive less
cross-examination protection than under current law by being treated no
differently than an ordinary witness. Under the committee majority's rec-
ommendation, cross-examination on prior misconduct of the accused would
be limited to situations where the main purpose of the defense in attacking
prosecution witnesses was to raise an issue as to the witness, credibility.
Cross-examination of the accused on his past misconduct would not be per-
mitted unless it was relevant to his own credibility as a witness. 249 If an
attack against the prosecution would be necessary in order to put forward a
defense, the accused would not automatically be subject to such extensive
cross-examination. Even this cross-examination can be avoided if the impu-
tations are raised by the defendant without himself giving evidence.
250
Reactions to the proposal to permit adverse inferences to be drawn from
trial silence have been mixed. The Senate of the Inns of Court and the Bar
objected to any change in the accused's right to silence at trial because of
concern that it would undercut the prosecution's duty to prove guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.25 1 Whether or not adverse inferences are permitted,
perhaps there is something wrong in calling the accused to the witness box in
order to highlight his failure to give testimony. 252 The position of JUSTICE
also avoided making any proposals to alter the right of silence at trial. In
their view "only the trial judge should be entitled to comment adversely in
reasonable terms, provided he also invites the jury to take into account any
special circumstances which might have led the accused to maintain
silence.'"253
While changes in the right to silence at trial as well as during pre-trial
questioning can be treated similarly, there are sufficient distinctions between
the two to warrant differing treatment. Pre-trial questioning occurs while
the suspect is in police custody and before the state has made out a prima
facie case. Eliminating the right to silence at so early a stage could well
encourage fishing expeditions against individuals who are only vaguely sus-
pected of involvement in a criminal offense. Absent reforms to improve the
accuracy and reliability of the record of pre-trial questioning, there is a risk
that too much weight may be placed upon police testimony as to what the
suspect did or did not say. Problems relating to the accuracy and reliability
of the record have no bearing upon the right to silence at trial. By adding
248. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at $ 4.67. Both the Criminal Law Revision
Committee and the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure recognized that some provision
would have to be made for an unrepresented accused to address the court on any matter which
his representative could have done had he had one. Id.; CLRC Report, supra note 4, at T 105.
249. CLRC Report, supra note 4, at 1 126, 127.
250. R. v. Butterwasser, [19481 K.B. 4.
251. Senate of the Inns of Court and the Bar, Submission to the Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure 11 (1979). See also MacKenna, Criminal Law Revision Committees' Eleventh
Report., Some Comments, 1972 CRIM. L. REV. 605, 619-20.
252. Radzifiowicz, Them and Us, 1972 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 260, 275.
253. JUSTICE, Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure, $ 48, at 23 (1979).
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qualifications requiring that the state establish its case against the accused
based upon independent evidence, with adverse inferences from silence serv-
ing only as supplementary evidence, it is possible to minimize the objection
that reform of the right to silence would serve to alter the burden of proof.
Elimination of the right to silence at trial occurs only after the accused has
had the opportunity to consult with counsel.
Despite grounds for distinguishing the right to silence at trial, the Royal
Commission on Criminal Procedure rejected any change in the existing rules
governing judicial comment on the accused's failure to give evidence. In its
view, "any modification to the present law of evidence which aimed at re-
quiring the accused to answer a primafacie case established by the prosecu-
tion would be likely to weaken the initial burden of proof that the
accusatorial system of trial places upon the prosecution. '254 The Royal
Commission, however, recommended abolition of the right to make an un-
sworn statement from the dock.2 5 5 Nevertheless, some support still exists for
authorizing comment on the defendant's failure to take the stand2 56 and the
Privy Council has indicated in its review of a Singapore conviction that such
comment is not inconsistent with English legal principles. 257 Given the fre-
quency with which defendants take the stand to give testmony 258 the case
for expanding judicial comment and authorizing prosecutorial comment on
silence is perhaps not of great practical significance. More important would
be the elimination of the right to make an unsworn statement from the dock
if in fact the incidence of such unsworn statements is on the rise.2 59 Such a
change would permit the accused's story to be tested by cross-examination,
but with the protections against the revelation of prior convictions provided
by the Criminal Evidence Act.
IV. THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE BILL
The process of rethinking self-incrimination principles in Great Britain
has been much more than an academic exercise. The Criminal Law Revi-
sion Committee's Evidence Report was the subject of an extended parli-
mentary debate and became a heated issue among interested groups.
260
Despite the fact that several of its recommendations proved so controversial
that the Government decided to abandon the Report in its entirety, 26 1 some
of the Committee's self-incrimination proposals have been adopted else-
254. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at 4.66.
255. Id. at 4.67. See also Law Society, Memorandum on the Royal Commissions' Report,
5.13, at 23 (1981).
256. E.g., Interview with Sir David Napley, former president Law Society (December 3,
1981). Sir David supported comments on the defendant's failure to take the stand as long as
this would not constitute evidence of guilt, and despite the fact that he objected to adverse
inferences arising out of the accused's failure to answer police questions.
257. Haw Tua Tau v. Public Prosecutor, [1981] 3 W.L.R. 395 (Singapore).
258. Michael Zander, Written Evidence Submitted to the Royal Commission on Criminal
Procedure 84 (1978).
259. Interview with Lord Justice Eveleigh (November 19, 1981).
260. See generally Gerstein, The Se/f-Incrimination Debate in Great Britain, 27 AM. J. COMp. L. 81
(1979).
261. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at 1.31.
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where with Privy Council approval. 262
The Government has become even more involved in self-incrimination
reform in the aftermath of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure. It
submitted a Police and Criminal Evidence Bill 263 to Parliament which in-
corporated many of the Commission recommendations. Final action was
prevented by the dissolution of Parliament and the subsequent general elec-
tion, however, the retention of a Conservative majority in Parliament makes
it likely that comparable legislation will be resubmitted.
The Criminal Law Revision Committee's recommended changes in the
right to silence were not incorporated in the Government's Police and Crimi-
nal Evidence Bill. Most of the opposition to the Committee's entire report
centered on the proposals to permit adverse inferences to be drawn from an
accused's silence in police questioning and failure to testify at trial. Given
the absence of support from the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure
for the reconsideration of the Committee's proposals, the Government un-
derstandably left them out of its legislative recommendations.
The Police and Criminal Evidence Bill did incorporate the Royal Com-
mission recommendation calling for the abolition of the voluntariness test as
the standard governing the admissibility of confessions. 264 Pursuant to
clause 60 of the Bill, confessions would be excludable if they were obtained
(a) by oppression of the accused; or
(b) in consequence of anything said or done which was likely, in
the circumstances existing at the time, to render unreliable
any confession which might be made by the accused in conse-
quence thereof.
2 65
The Secretary of State was authorized to issue a code of practice governing
police interrogations. 266 No provision made a violation of the code the basis
for excluding evidence, but it could be taken into account if "relevant to any
question arising in the proceedings. '267 Presumably this was intended to
reflect the Royal Commission proposal that the jury be informed that a code
violation might render a confession unreliable. 268 The Government proposal
further provided that a court could also consider evidence as to the truth or
falsity of a confession in determining its admissibility. 269 Exclusion of a
statement would not affect the admissibility of derivative evidence, nor of
testimony that such derivative evidence was discovered as a result of a state-
ment made by the accused.
2 70
262. Haw Tua Tau v. Public Prosecutor, [1981] 3 W.L.R. 395 (Singapore)z Meng Heong
Yeo, Diminishing the Right to Silence: The Singpore Experience, 1983 CRIM. L. REV. 89.
263. Police and Criminal Evidence Bill (H.C. Bill No. 16, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Evi-
dence Bill]. See Times of London, December 1, 1982, at p. 4, col. 1.
264. See supra, pp. 9-12.
265. Evidence Bill, supra note 263, at clause 60. The prosecution must establish admissibil-
ity beyond a reasonable doubt if such a challenge is made. Id.
266. Id. at clause 52(1). Other subjects covered were the treatment, identification and de-
tention practices of the police.
267. Id. at clause 52(8).
268. Royal Commission Report, supra note 4, at § 4.133.
269. Evidence Bill, supra note 263, at clause 60(4).
270. Id. at clause 60(6).
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The Government's proposals appear to leave confession admissibility
standards unclear. Oppression is defined to include torture, inhuman or de-
grading treatment, and the use or threat of violence, 2 71 but these are hardly
precise phrases and are only illustrations of the conduct prohibited. The
alternative standard requiring exclusion of confessions given in circum-
stances likely to render them unreliable represents an entirely new legal prin-
ciple lacking any consensus as to its content. It will be interesting to see, if
adopted, what tactics are viewed as offensive to the likely-reliability test, par-
ticularly in light of the fact that evidence as to the truth or falsity of the
confession is admissible in judging whether the confession should be
excluded.
The Government proposal, as was true for the Royal Commission rec-
ommendation on which it was based, reflects a policy which is likely to make
the exclusion of confessions more difficult. The objective of confession relia-
bility reflected in the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill may well create a
risk that police will feel that they have even greater authority than at present
to secure a confession. They may see the signal of the proposal as permission
to secure involuntary confessions as long as they are not obtained through
oppression, and as long as they are reliable. The result may well be even
greater reliance by police on custodial interrogation despite criticism of the
process.
2 72
Elsewhere in the legislation specific additional authority is given to po-
lice. Under the Bill as originally proposed, a maximum of twenty-four hours
of police detention was-allowed before a charge had to be made. 273 A magis-
trate upon ex parte motion could permit an additional twenty-four hours of
detention if the accused was involved in a serious arrestable offense and fur-
ther detention was "necessary to enable the police to preserve evidence of or
relating to that offense or to obtain such evidence by questioning that per-
son." 2 74 The imprecision of the standard is compounded by the definition of
a serious arrestable offense as an arrestable offense "which the person con-
templating the exercise of the power considers to be sufficiently serious to
justify his exercising of."' 275 A warrant of further detention, based upon the
same standards, would have permitted the confinement to extend an addi-
tional forty-eight hours.276 Even though the Government proposed as an
alternative that initial detention be limited to twenty-four hours, extended
for a further twelve hours on the authority of a police superintendent, and a
further sixty hours by a magistrates' court, the Law Society remained op-
posed. 277 It viewed twenty-four hours as the upper limit for police deten-
tion, with the total maximum after magistrate court review as seventy-two
271. Id. at clause 60(7).
272. Times of London, March 8, 1983, at 14, col. 2 (remarks of Peter Thornton, Chairman,
National Council for Civil Liberties).
273. Evidence Bill, supra note 263, at clause 32.
274. Id. at clause 33.
275. Id. at clause 74.
276. Id. at clause 34.
277. Law Society, The Law Society and the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill, § 5 (1983);





Extended detention is an obvious aid to police in their efforts to interro-
gate a suspect. The impact of detention can be mitigated by requirements
that police notify an individual selected by the accused that he has been
arrested 279 and that he be allowed access to a solicitor.280 Where the statu-
tory prerequisites are met, however, even the rights of notification of arrest
and access to a solicitor can be limited. The Government's proposals permit
delay in providing notification of arrest if there are reasonable grounds to
believe that other suspects might be alerted; individuals might be harmed; or
there might be interference with evidence connected with a serious arrest-
able offense.28' The same factors along with reasonable grounds to believe
that there will be a hindrance to the recovery of property, justify delaying an
accused access to his solicitor.
28 2
Even though no formal proposals are before Parliament to eliminate the
right to silence or to draw adverse inferences from its exercise, it is clear that
an effort is being made to create a police interrogation environment condu-
cive to obtaining confessions and a standard of admissibility directed toward
the exclusion of only unreliable statements. If an accused can withstand the
impact of extended detention without access to an outsider, he will be pro-
tected by the right to silence. The reliability standard may have only a mi-
nor impact in controlling the interrogation tactics police employ. Perhaps
the real premise is that an accused should not be entitled to withhold infor-
mation from the authorities, but the techniques of furthering that objective
by authorizing the jury to draw an adverse inference from his silence or by
removing all restraints from the police interrogation process offend other im-
portant values. The only limits necessary, therefore, are those which restrict
oppressive tactics and create a likelihood of false confessions. Not surpris-
ingly, questions have been raised as to whether the limits have been properly
set.
283
The tenor of the draft interrogation code28 4 is fully consistent with the
approach of the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill. Its provisions essentially
repeat the terms of the proposed statute in the areas of notifying someone of
the accused's arrest and providing or withholding access to a solicitor.
2 85
Even where access to a solicitor is provided, the accused may be denied the
right to the presence of his solicitor during the interview if an officer of ap-
propriate rank has reasonable grounds to believe this would interfere with
the conduct of the interrogation. 2 6 The police need not await the arrival of
278. Law Society, The Law Society and the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill, § 5 (1983).
279. Evidence Bill, supra note 263, at clause 44.
280. Id. at clause 46.
281. Id. at clause 44(4).
282. Id. at clause 46(7).
283. Opposition has been voiced by such groups as the Law Society, Legal Action Group,
National Council for Civil Liberties, Magistrates' Association and Justices' Clerks' Society.
Times of London, February 21, 1983, at 4, col. 1; March 8, 1983, at 3, col. 1.
284. Home Office, Draft Rules Governing the Treatment and Questioning of Persons in
Police Custody (1982).
285. Id. at 4.2, 5.2.
286. Id. at 5.5.
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the solicitor before beginning the interview if there are reasonable grounds to
believe that delay would risk harm to persons or property, or simply unrea-
sonably delay the processes of investigation.
28 7
In place of the Judges' Rules, the code calls for administering the fol-
lowing caution when the police have reasonable grounds for suspecting that
the accused has committed an offense: "I am going to ask you some ques-
tions. You do not have to reply unless you wish to do so, but whatever you
say will be written down and may be given in evidence. '288 The code re-
flects very little effort to control the interrogation process itself. There is a
restriction barring questioning between midnight and 8:00 a.m. absent justi-
fication, 28 9 a ban against the questioning of individuals intoxicated by li-
quor or drugs to the point of being unable to appreciate the nature of the
proceedings, 290 a prohibition against requiring the individual to stand dur-
ing the questioning, 29' a requirement that interview rooms not cause dis-
comfort,2 9 2 and a duty to provide reasonable refreshments and breaks.
293
The techniques of interrogation, touching such problems as what kinds of
promises or threats are permissible, how much deception is authorized, and
whether the suspect may terminate the interview, were left untreated. The
issue of tape recording police interrogations was also avoided in the code and
appears to remain in an experimental status.
294
V. CONCLUSION
Much of the current of self-incrimination reform in Great Britain, seen
in the efforts of the Criminal Law Revision Committee, Royal Commission
on Criminal Procedure, and recent Government proposals, reflects opposi-
tion to the broad scope of the privilege as it presently exists. Many of the
proposals have taken issue with the very core self-incrimination concept of
the right to refuse to provide information to the state free of having silence
brought to the attention of the jury. Others have sought to formalize the
practice of incommunicado questioning over an extended period, subject
only to the satisfaction of relatively flexible criteria. A major challenge has
been made to the long-standing voluntariness test for confession admissibil-
ity, with a minimal code of police conduct and the exclusion of unreliable
statements offered as an alternative.
287. Id. at 5.4.
288. Id. at 10.1.
289. Id. at 111.2.
290. Id. at 11.3.
291. Id. at 11.5.
292. Id. at 11.4.
293. Id. at 11.7.
294. The Home Office announced plans to conduct a two year experiment involving tape
recording interrogations in six police divisions. Times of London, November 16, 1982, at p. 2,
col. 5. This follows the conclusion of a Scottish experiment in tape recording police interroga-
tions which revealed such problems as police circumventing the tape recording procedures and
questions as to the impact of the recording system on the ability of police to secure admissions
from suspects. See McConville and Morrell, Recording the Interrogaton." Have the Police Got it
Taped? 1983 CRIM. L. REv. 158; Times of London, November 29, 1982, at p. 1, col. 7. For a
general discussion of the draft code formulation see Mirfield, The Draft Code on Poice Questionig-
A Comment, 1982 CRIM. L. REV. 659.
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All of the proposals accept the need to prohibit uncivilized conduct in
the questioning of an accused and keep unreliable evidence out of the deci-
sion-making process. Both objectives overlap since improper interrogation
techniques damage the reliability of statements they may produce. Beyond
these concerns, however, the self-incrimination principle is an obstacle to the
acquisition of evidence. The self-incrimination reform movement in Great
Britain has largely been aimed at removing that obstacle to the extent politi-
cally feasible. Evidence reliability remains an important concern in Britain,
and thus there are concessions to the need for restraints to protect against
false confessions. The movement, however, appears not to believe that the
risk of false confessions is a serious concern, and sees little further value in the
enforcement of the accused's right of silence. The expectations are undoubt-
edly that admissions will be more readily obtained and more clearly admissi-
ble as evidence. Whether Parliament will enact the proposed legislation and
what its actual effect will be remain to be seen.
295
295. Action on the 1982 Police and Criminal Evidence Bill was suspended due to the disso-
lution of Parliament and general election in 1983. New legislation, however, has been presented
in the form of a resubmitted Police and Criminal Evidence Bill. See Times of London, October
27, 1983, at 4, col. 1. The Home Secretary, Mr. Leon Brittan, stated in Parliament that the
Government's position was that the Bill would provide police with the powers required to inves-
tigate crime, but with no more powers than were really needed. Times of London, November 8,
1983, at 4, col. 1. Nevertheless, opposition has developed out of concern that police powers
created by the Bill could be misused. See Times of London, November 9, 1983, at 2, col. 1;
October 27, 1983, at 1, col. 8. Parliamentary action will no doubt be influenced by the Metro-
politan Police study demonstrating a crisis of confidence in the London Police. Times of
London, November 19, 1983, at 1, col. 2. Indeed, the Home Secretary made reference to this
study in his statement in support of the Bill. Times of London, November 8, 1983, at 4, col. 1.
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